HOWARD STENNES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In this Fourth Amendment case, the court held that a police officer's blocking of Stennes's vehicle with his patrol car constituted an investigatory stop rather than a consensual encounter, and the stop was unsupported by reasonable suspicion. The court reversed the denial of the motion to suppress, finding that the subsequent seizure of marijuana and cocaine was fruit of an unconstitutional search.
The court held that the officer's blocking of the Explorer with his patrol car created an investigatory stop, not a consensual encounter, because Stennes was no longer free to leave. The stop was unsupported by reasonable suspicion, as Stennes was legally parked and not engaged in any observable unlawful activity, and the late hour combined with the area's burglary history were insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.
[1] An encounter initiated by a police officer blocking a vehicle, thereby preventing its departure, constitutes an investigatory stop, not a consensual encounter.
[2] An investigatory stop requires reasonable suspicion that a person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The officer's blocking of the Explorer created an investigatory stop and not a consensual encounter, because Stennes was no longer free to leave to avoid answering the officer's questions.”
Establishes that the blocking action transformed what the officer claimed was a consensual encounter into a custodial investigatory stop
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceStennes was sitting in his Ford Explorer parked in a dark area behind an open gas station at 11:30 p.m., talking to a passenger in an adjacent Monte C…
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GROSS, J.
The issue in this case is whether a marijuana pipe and cocaine rocks were the fruits of a search that violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We hold that the search occurred after an investigatory stop that was unsupported by reasonable suspicion, and reverse.
Appellant Howard Stennes was sitting in his Ford Explorer in a dark area behind an open gas station at 11:30 p.m. A white Monte Carlo was parked next to Stennes, who was talking to that car’s passenger. The Monte Carlo left the area. Although the testimony conflicted, the trial court found that the arresting officer pulled his marked police car, with headlights on, directly behind Stennes’s Explorer, so that he was blocked from leaving. The officer then initiated what he described as “a consensual encounter” that yielded contraband.
In the circuit court, after Stennes’s motion to suppress was denied, he changed his plea to nolo contendere, reserving his right to appeal.
On an appeal of a motion to suppress evidence, this court defers to the trial court’s factual findings but reviews legal conclusions de novo. See, e.g., Pantin v. State, 872 So. 2d 1000, 1002 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). We may not substitute our judgment for that of the circuit court on issues of credibility that led to the lower court’s resolution of conflicts in the evidence. See State v. Brown, 592 So. 2d 308, 310 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (Gersten, J., dissenting).
The officer’s blocking of the Explorer created an investigatory stop and not a consensual encounter, because Sten-nes was no longer free to leave to avoid answering the officer’s questions. See Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185, 187-88 (Fla.1993); Young v. State, 803 So. 2d 880, 882 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). As the fifth district has written, “positioning a patrol car to obstruct the path of [a] vehicle once it is stopped elevates the encounter to an investigatory stop.” Young, 803 So. 2d at 882 (citing Griffin v. State, 800 So. 2d 345, 347 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)) (stating “when [the officers] drove their vehicle behind the appellant’s car, effectively preventing his exit, [the appellant] could not leave. Therefore, the police effected a stop unsupported by either reasonable suspicion or probable cause.”) (citations omitted); see Richardson v. State, 291 So. 2d 253, 255 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974) (holding a stop was effected where officer’s vehicle blocked defendant’s vehicle from proceeding); see also L.J.S. v. State, 905 So. 2d 222, 225 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Cowart v. State, 635 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Palmer v. State, 625 So. 2d 1303 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).
To justify an investigatory stop, the arresting officer had to have a reasonable suspicion that Stennes had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. See Ippolito v. State, 789 So. 2d 423, 425 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). Whether an officer has a reasonable suspicion for a stop depends on the totality of the circumstances, interpreted in light of the officer’s knowledge and experience at the time of the stop; a “mere ‘hunch’ that criminal activity may be occurring is not sufficient.” Id. (citations omitted).
Here, Stennes was legally parked behind an open gas station “not engaged in any observable unlawful activity.” Id. at 425. The officer observed no potentially illegal activity in the interaction between the occupants of the Monte Carlo and Stennes. Without more, the late hour and the history of burglaries in the area did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that Stennes had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. Id. The trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress.
Reversed and Remanded.
GUNTHER and FARMER, JJ., concur.
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Clive Gentles v. State, 50 So. 3d 1192 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)…e defendant was improperly seized and the search that followed was illegal). Other vehicle-related police conduct found by Florida courts to constitute a seizure or detention include: using a police car to block the path of a car, Stennes v. State, 939 So. 2d 1148, 1149 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); shining a flashlight or spotlight on a defendant’s car, Leroy v. State, 982 So. 2d 1250, 1252 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); displaying a weapon or physically touching the per [*1198] son, State v. Dixon, 976 So. 2d 1206, 1209 (Fla.…
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Rodriguez v. State, 948 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)…ass muster under the Fourth Amendment, police must have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 791 So. 2d 1246, 1249 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). A mere hunch is insufficient. See, e.g., Stennes v. State, 939 So. 2d 1148, 1150 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). The instant case involves a stop as a consequence of a BOLO and, under this circumstance, several factors are relevant in assessing the propriety of the stop: “the length of time and distance from the offense, route of fli…
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Hollingsworth v. State, 991 So. 2d 990 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)…nvestigatory stop, the arresting officer had to have a reasonable suspicion that [Ms. Hollingsworth] had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime.” Mitchell v. State, 955 So. 2d 640, 642 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (citing Stennes v. State, 939 So. 2d 1148, 1149 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)); accord Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000). Here, the officer suspected Ms. Hollingsworth of loitering and prowling in violation of section 856.021, Florida Statutes (2004). The c…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Tedd J. Popple v. State, 626 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1993)
- Donnie Young v. State, 803 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)
- Pantin v. State, 872 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)
- Richardson v. State, 291 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)
- Pasley v. State, 625 So. 2d 1303 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)
- Ippolito v. State, 789 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)
- State v. Brown, 592 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)
- Amos Lewis Cowart v. State, 635 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
- Nitika Griffin v. State, 800 So. 2d 345 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)
- L.J.S. v. State, 905 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)