DADE COUNTY
v.
PRIEST, ET AL.
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
This case addresses whether a mortgagee has standing to contest the amount of just compensation awarded in an eminent domain proceeding. The court held that mortgagees, lacking an estate or interest in the land, cannot participate in determining the property's value but may petition for apportionment of the award to protect their lien rights.
A mortgagee, having no estate or interest in the land but only a lien securing the debt, has no standing to participate in determining the property's value or contest the compensation award. However, the mortgagee may file a petition for apportionment of the award to protect its equitable rights as a lienholder.
“A mortgagee does not have an estate or interest in mortgaged lands, by virtue of his mortgage, but is merely the owner of a chose in action creating a lien on the property”
Establishes that mortgagees lack title or ownership interest; they hold only a security interest
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWashington Federal Savings & Loan Association, as mortgagee on parcel 269, moved to vacate a final judgment determining just compensation in an eminen…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Apportionment Of Award cases and more on FLexlaw
Order denying defendant mortgagee’s motion to vacate judgment— parcel 269: This matter came on to be heard on the motion of Washington Federal Savings & Loan Association of Miami Beach to vacate the final judgment heretofore entered as to parcel 269 in the above styled suit.
The issue presented is whether a mortgagee has the right to contest the amount of the award, i.e., the just compensation to be paid to the owners for the taking of the parcel.
It is well settled that mortgagees are not classified as “owners” in eminent domain proceedings in Florida. Major Realty Corporation v. Florida State Turnpike Authority, Fla. App. 1964, 160 So.2d 125; Shavers v. Duval County, Fla. 1954, 73 So.2d 684; Seaboard All-Florida Railway Company v. Leavitt, Fla. 1932, 105 Fla. 600, 141 So. 886; Investors Syndicate of America v. Dade County, Fla. 1957, 98 So.2d 889; Watts v. Duval County, Fla. 1954, 75 So.2d 316.
In Shavers v. Duval County, supra, the Supreme Court said, at page 687 — “A mortgagee does not have an estate or interest *135in mortgaged lands, by virtue of his mortgage, but is merely the owner of a chose in action creating a lien on the property . . The court cited Evins v. Gainesville National Bank, Fla. 1920, 80 Fla. 84, 85 So. 659, where it had ruled that (85 So. at page 660) — “A mortgagee, either before or after default in payment, has no title by virtue of his mortgage to the mortgaged real estate. His interest is simply a specific lien for the security of the debt mentioned in the mortgage . . .” The court also cited Waldock v. Iba, Fla. 1934, 114 Fla. 786, 150 So. 231, 803, 153 So. 915, where it had earlier held (153 So. 915-916) — “A mortgage does not create an interest in the land. It is a chose in action which creates a lien on land.”
As stated in Watts v. Duval County, Fla. 1954, 75 So.2d 316, (a companion case to Shavers v. Duval County, supra) — “The mortgagee was entitled to follow the fund paid into the registry of the court and to receive full compensation determined by the circuit judge on equitable principles.” See also Jacksonville Expressway Authority v. Milford, Fla. 1959, 115 So.2d 778.
From the foregoing case law and from an examination of chapter 73, Florida Statutes, this court finds and determines that mortgagees, having no estate or interest in the land, have no standing to participate in the determination of its value. Florida Eminent Domain Practice and Procedure, §6.28.
It is ordered and adjudged that— (1) The motion of Washington Federal Savings & Loan Association of Miami Beach to vacate the final judgment heretofore entered is denied. (2) The mortgagee may file an appropriate petition for apportionment of the award made by said final judgment, so that its equitable rights, if any, to share in the award, may be determined by this court.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Shavers v. Duval Cnty., 73 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1954)
- Evins v. The Gainesville Nat'l Bank, 80 Fla. 84 (Fla. 1920)
- Seaboard All-Florida Railway v. Florabel Levitt, 105 Fla. 600 (Fla. 1932)
- Waldock v. Iba, 114 Fla. 786 (Fla. 1933)
- Jacksonville Expressway Auth. v. Milford, 115 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959)
- Major Realty Corp. v. Fla. State Tpk. Auth., 160 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)
- Invs. Syndicate OF Am., Inc. v. Dade Cnty., 98 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 3d DCA 1957)
- Olin E. Watts Under the Last Will and Testament and Codicil thereto of A. F. Baines v. Duval Cnty., 75 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 1954)