ANTHONY GARDNER, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Defendant's motion to correct illegal sentence seeking jail time credit for residential drug treatment program participation was properly denied because such programs do not constitute the functional equivalent of county jail under Florida law.
Time spent in a residential drug treatment program as a condition of probation does not qualify for jail time credit under Florida Statutes section 921.161(1).
[1] Time spent in a residential drug treatment program as a condition of probation does not constitute the functional equivalent of a county jail and therefore does not quali…
Previewing 1 of 1 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A sentence of imprisonment shall not begin to run before the date it is imposed, but the court imposing a sentence shall allow a defendant credit for all of the time she or he spent in the county jail before sentence.”
Section 921.161(1), Florida Statutes (2005), defining when jail time credit must be allowed.
Anthony Gardner was sentenced and sought jail time credit for time spent in a residential drug treatment program while on probation and as a special c…
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ROTHENBERG, Judge.
The defendant, Anthony Gardner (“Gardner”), appeals the denial of his motion to correct illegal sentence filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), in which Gardner sought jail time credit for time spent in a residential drug treatment program while on probation and as a special condition to his probation. We affirm.
Section 921.161(1), Florida Statutes (2005), provides:
A sentence of imprisonment shall not begin to run before the date it is imposed, but the court imposing a sentence shall allow a defendant credit for all of the time she or he spent in the county jail before sentence. The credit must be for a specified period of time and shall be provided for in the sentence.
The Florida Supreme Court in Tal-Mason v. State, 515 So. 2d 738 (Fla.1987), interpreted section 921.161(1), Florida Statutes, to apply to any period of time “served prior to conviction in any institution serving as the functional equivalent of a county jail,” and interpreted “the functional equivalent of a county jail” as not to include time spent in a drug rehabilitation facility as a condition of probation. Id. at 740; see also State v. Cregan, 908 So. 2d 387, 389 (Fla.2005); Pennington v. State, 398 So. 2d 815, 816 (Fla.1981); Molina v. State, 867 So. 2d 645, 645 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004). Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Tal-Mason v. State, 515 So. 2d 738 (Fla. 1987)
- Doretha Pennington v. State, 398 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 1981)
- State v. Cregan, 908 So. 2d 387 (Fla. 2005)
- Molina v. State, 867 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)