QUENTIN LAWRENCE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 4th DCA | 2006-11-29
No. 4D06-1003
GUNTHER and GROSS, JJ., concur.
942 So. 2d 467 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District (2006) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

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Synopsis

A defendant was stopped for illegal window tinting on a rear passenger-side door window and challenges the stop as unlawful, arguing the statute did not restrict tinting on that window. The Fourth District affirms, holding that section 316.2954 prohibits tinting on all windows "behind the driver," which includes rear seating compartment windows.


Holding

Section 316.2954 applies to all windows in the rear seating compartment, including passenger-side door windows, because all such windows are necessarily "behind the driver" if they are neither forward of nor adjacent to the driver's seat.


Headnotes

[1] Statutes governing vehicle window tinting must be read in conjunction to cover all windows of a vehicle.

[2] The phrase "any windows behind the driver" in a statute regulating vehicle window tinting includes all windows rearward of the driver, including those in the rear-seating…

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Key Quotes

“The two statutes must be read together, for they were meant to cover all windows in a vehicle.”

Establishes that sections 316.2953 and 316.2954 form an integrated statutory scheme

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Facts & Procedural History

A deputy stopped defendant's four-door Acura believing the windows had illegal tinting. The deputy used a tint meter on the passenger-side door window…

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Opinion of the Court
FARMER, J.

FARMER, J.

In affirming the trial court’s reading of a statute, we write to explain an issue of first impression.

While driving a four-door Acura, defendant was stopped in the early morning by a deputy who saw what he thought were windows with illegal tinting. He placed a tint meter on the passenger-side door window in the rear seating compartment, which yielded a reading outside the permitted range established in section 316.2954.1 As a result of the stop, defendant was also charged with driving while his license had been revoked and for possession of cannabis, in addition to the improper equipment citation issued for the window tint violation.

Defendant filed a motion to suppress, claiming he was unlawfully stopped. He argued that section 316.2954 did not restrict tinting on the passenger-side window in the rear seating compartment. The trial court disagreed and denied the motion. Defendant argues on appeal that the statutory interpretation was error. Defendant points out that another statute limits window tinting on all windows forward of, or adjacent to, the operator’s seat. § 316.2953, Fla. Stat. (2005). Defendant then leaps from that observation to argue that the statutory text “behind the driver” in section 316.2954 does not encompass the window located in the rear-seating compartment — the one behind the passenger — because it is not in a straight line behind the driver. We do agree that the windows in the rear seating compartment are outside of the section 316.2953 definition because they are neither forward of nor adjacent to the driver’s seat.

The two statutes must be read together, for they were meant to cover all windows in a vehicle. The text of section 316.2954(1) refers to “any windows behind the driver.” [e.s.] All door windows in the rear-seating compartment of this vehicle are necessarily (in varying angles) behind the driver if they are neither forward of nor adjacent to the driver’s seat. The text in section 316.2954(1) was meant to include all windows in the vehicle rearward of the driver, whether on the doors or in the middle rear of the vehicle. We find no error in the trial judge’s reading of this text.

Affirmed.

GUNTHER and GROSS, JJ., concur. . "A person shall not operate any motor vehicle on any public highway, road, or street on which vehicle any windows behind the driver are composed of, covered by, or treated with any sunscreening material, or other product or material which has the effect of making the window nontransparent or which would alter the window’s color, increase its reflectivity, or reduce its light transmittance....” § 316.2954(1), Fla. Stat. (2005).


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Citator

Cited By

  • State v. Petion, 992 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)
    …etion was operating was lawfully stopped by the sergeant. It is well established that an officer can stop a car for an inoperable tag light, see Cole v. State, 838 So. 2d 1205, 1205 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), or for a tint violation, see Lawrence v. State, 942 So. 2d 467, 468 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Davis v. State, 788 So. 2d 308, 309 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). The circuit court made findings of historical fact, supported by competent, substantial evidence, that support its decision that this case involved both an inoperable…

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