TOMAS TOLOSA ARINO, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Appellant was convicted of driving with a revoked license as a habitual traffic offender and appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to bifurcate the trial. The court affirmed, holding that bifurcation was improper because the habitual traffic offender designation was an essential element of the charged crime, not a separate lesser offense.
The trial court properly denied the motion to bifurcate because the habitual traffic offender designation was an essential element of the crime charged, bifurcation would have required the state to prove an uncharged lesser offense, and bifurcation would have provided little benefit since the state could still introduce appellant's driving record under Florida Statutes § 322.201.
[1] A trial court is not required to bifurcate a trial for driving while license revoked as an habitual traffic offender when the prior designation as an habitual traffic off…
[2] Driving while license suspended is not a lesser included offense of driving while license revoked as an habitual traffic offender.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Driving while license suspended, as prohibited by section 322.34(2) is not a lesser included offense of driving while license revoked as an habitual traffic offender.”
Establishes the legal basis for rejecting bifurcation—the two offenses are distinct, so splitting the trial would be improper.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant Tomas Tolosa Arino was charged with driving while his license was revoked as an habitual traffic offender under Florida Statutes § 322.34(5)…
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EVANDER, J.
Appellant was convicted of driving while his license was revoked as an habitual traffic offender, in violation of section 322.34(5), Florida Statutes (2003). Appellant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to bifurcate. We disagree and affirm appellant’s conviction.
Prior to the commencement of his jury trial, appellant requested that the trial court divide his trial into two proceedings. The purpose of the first proceeding, as requested by appellant, would be to determine whether appellant was driving upon Florida’s highways while his license was suspended. If found guilty in the first proceeding, the second proceeding would be utilized to determine whether appellant had been designated an habitual traffic offender pursuant to section 322.264, Florida Statutes (2003). Appellant strenuously argued that a failure to bifurcate would be unduly prejudicial because the jury would be informed of his prior criminal activity— thereby destroying his presumption of innocence.
Appellant’s proposed bifurcation would have been improper. Driving while license suspended, as prohibited by section 322.34(2) is not a lesser included offense of driving while license revoked as an habitual traffic offender. State v. Harvey, 693 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). A bifurcated proceeding would have wrongly forced the state to try to prove a crime which it had not charged nor which was a lesser included offense of the crime charged.
Additionally, bifurcation would have provided little benefit for appellant. The state would still have been permitted to introduce a certified copy of appellant’s driving record. § 322.201, Fla. Stat. (2003). See also Arthur v. State, 818 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), rev. denied, 839 So. 2d 697 (Fla.2003).
The Department of Motor Vehicles’ designation of appellant as an habitual traffic offender was an essential element of the crime charged. Therefore, it was appropriate for the state to present evidence on this element. Arnett v. State, 843 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). See also Syder v. State, 921 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (bifurcation improper where defendant was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon).
AFFIRMED.
ORFINGER and LAWSON, JJ., concur.
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Cited By
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Bontarius Milton v. State, 19 So. 3d 1143 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)…1th Cir.1993); United States v. Collamore, 868 F. 2d 24, 27-28 (1st Cir.1989), overruled on other grounds, United States v. Tavares, 21 F. 3d 1 (1st Cir.1994); United States v. Brinklow, 560 F. 2d 1003, 1006 (10th Cir.1977). See also Arino v. State, 944 So. 2d 1120, 1121 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (rejecting argument that trial court erred in refusing to bifurcate proceedings for defendant charged with driving as an habitual traffic offender while license revoked because a “bifurcated proceeding would have wrongly fo…
Authorities Cited
- Arthur v. State, 818 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)
- State v. Oberlin D. Harvey, 693 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
- Syder v. State, 921 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)
- Arnett v. State, 843 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)