JOHN E. SMITH, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Smith challenges his sentence imposed under the 1984 sentencing guidelines, arguing the sentence is illegal because he committed his crimes before the guidelines became effective and was never given the opportunity to elect sentencing under pre-guidelines law. The court reverses the trial court's summary denial and remands for resentencing under pre-guidelines law, finding that the procedural bar would result in manifest injustice.
The sentence is illegal because the trial court lacked authority to sentence Smith under guidelines that did not become effective until July 1, 1984, and Smith did not affirmatively elect to be sentenced under the guidelines. Despite the procedural bar from a prior motion, Smith is entitled to relief because application of the bar would result in manifest injustice, as he would have an opportunity to be eligible for parole upon resentencing under pre-guidelines law.
[1] A sentence imposed under invalid sentencing guidelines for a crime committed before the guidelines' effective date, without an affirmative election by the defendant to be…
[2] A procedural bar to relief from an illegal sentence may be overcome when its application would result in manifest injustice, such as precluding parole eligibility.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court 'was without legal authority to sentence the appellant under the guidelines.'”
Establishes that sentencing under guidelines not yet effective constitutes an illegal sentence.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSmith was charged with two counts of armed robbery on January 16, 1984, and convicted by jury. The trial court sentenced him to two concurrent life se…
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PER CURIAM.
The appellant challenges the trial court’s summary denial of his postconviction motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Because the appellant’s sentence is illegal and the procedural bar would result in manifest injustice, we reverse the trial court’s denial and remand for resentencing.
The appellant was charged with two counts of armed robbery on January 16, 1984. The appellant was convicted of both counts by a jury. The trial court sentenced the appellant under the 1984 guidelines to two concurrent life sentences. The appellant filed several motions seeking relief from his sentence. In the motion on appeal, the appellant alleged that his sentence is illegal because he was sentenced pursuant to invalid guidelines. The trial court denied his motion as procedurally barred.
The appellant is correct in his assertion that his sentence is illegal. In Smith v. State, 537 So. 2d 982 (Fla.1989), the supreme court declared that the guidelines did not become effective until they were adopted by the Legislature on July 1, 1984. In Smith, the supreme court also declared that any person sentenced for a crime committed prior to the effective date must affirmatively elect to be sentenced under the guidelines. Id. at 987. The appellant committed both of his crimes before this date and did not affirmatively elect to be sentenced under the guidelines; therefore, the trial court “was without legal authority to sentence the appellant under the guidelines.” Fowler v. State, 641 So. 2d 941, 942 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); see also Kunkel v. State, 765 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (reversing the denial of a rule 3.800(a) motion in which the defendant claimed that his sentence was illegal because “he was not given the opportunity to elect to be sentenced under thé pre-sentencing guidelines law, pursuant to which he would be eligible for parole”).
The trial court determined that the appellant had previously raised this claim in a prior motion and that' he was collaterally estopped from raising it in the motion on appeal. Despite this procedural bar, however, the appellant is entitled to relief. Because the appellant has an opportunity to be eligible for parole upon resentencing, the application of the procedural bar in this case would result in manifest injustice. See State v. McBride, 848 So. 2d 287, 291-292 (Fla.2003); see also Johnson v. State, 902 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).
We, therefore, reverse the trial court’s denial of the appellant’s motion and remand for resentencing under the preguide-lines law.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
BROWNING, C.J., DAVIS and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Davis v. State, 963 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)…s cases, many of which were specifically cited by Davis in his motion, which hold that this error constitutes an illegal sentence that may be corrected in a rule 3.800(a) motion. See Owen v. State, 864 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Smith v. State, 946 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (finding sentence illegal and, even though claim had been previously raised and rejected, application of a procedural bar [*351] would result in a manifest injustice (as defendant would be entitled to parole if a pre-guidelines s…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Antoine L. McBRIDE, 848 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 2003)
- Alphonso P. Smith v. State, 537 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1989)
- Fowler v. State, 641 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
- Brown v. Fuentes, 765 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)
- Kunkel v. State, 765 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)
- Caremark RX, Inc. v. State, 902 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)