DEXTER GUNN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The court affirmed the trial court's summary denial of postconviction relief, holding that the circuit court had subject matter jurisdiction to rule on a motion to suppress evidence in felony charges despite the motion being based on a traffic stop that resulted in separate county court charges.
A trial court has subject matter jurisdiction to rule on a motion to suppress evidence in felony charges even when the motion challenges the legality of a traffic stop that also resulted in unrelated charges prosecuted in county court.
[1] A trial court must review the merits of a postconviction motion raising a jurisdictional issue not previously considered on the merits, even if the motion is untimely fil…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDexter Gunn was prosecuted in Broward County circuit court for felonies and filed a postconviction motion to suppress evidence based on the allegedly …
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PER CURIAM.
We affirm the trial court’s summary denial of the motion for postconviction relief, but not its dismissal. We agree with the defendant that a trial court should review the merits of a postconviction motion, even if untimely, which raises a jurisdictional issue that was not previously considered on the merits. See Brown v. State, 917 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (reversing summary denial of rule 3.850 motion, and holding that the trial court was required to address the merits of defendant’s motions for postconviction relief where they raised jurisdictional issues that were not previously raised, as a void judgment may be collaterally attacked at any time). However, the ground for the instant motion lacks merit. The Broward County circuit court, where the defendant was prosecuted for felonies alleged to have been committed in Broward County, did not lack subject matter jurisdiction to rule on a motion to suppress evidence sought to be used in that case, see § 26.012(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (1989), even though the motion was based on the allegedly pretextual nature of a traffic stop, which also resulted in unrelated charges which were prosecuted in the county court.
Affirmed.
STEVENSON, C.J., and TAYLOR, J., concur. FARMER, J., concurs in result only.
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Carbajal v. State, 75 So. 3d 258 (Fla. 2011)…circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment or sentence was barred by the time limits of rule 3.850. The Second District certified that its decision on this issue expressly and directly conflicts with the following decisions: Gunn v. State, 947 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Brown v. State, 917 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005); Harris v. State, 854 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); and Harrell v. State, 721 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. Althoug…
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Spaulding v. State, 965 So. 2d 350 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)…ng their petitions. Although we recognize that the trial court should have addressed the merits of the petitions, which alleged a lack of trial court jurisdiction, we affirm because jurisdiction appears on the face of the record. See Gunn v. State, 947 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (agreeing with Brown v. State, 917 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005), that “a trial court should review the merits of a postconviction motion, even if untimely, [*351] which raises a jurisdictional issue that was not previously cons…
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Carbajal v. State, 28 So. 3d 187 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)…ly. We recognize that other courts have held that the two-year time limitation in rule 3.850(b) is inapplicable to a motion alleging that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter the defendant’s judgment or sentence. See, e.g., Gunn v. State, 947 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Brown, 917 So. 2d at 273; Harris v. State, 854 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003); Harrell v. State, 721 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).2 We do not find these cases persuasive because they do not explain why they apparently conclude…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Brown v. State, 917 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)