JAMES E. RICHARDSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Richardson challenged the trial court's summary denial of his Rule 3.850 postconviction relief motion, raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and an illegal sentence. The appellate court reversed, finding the claims facially sufficient because the trial court improperly delegated sentencing authority to the Department of Corrections rather than exercising its own judicial discretion.
Richardson stated valid claims for postconviction relief. The trial court erred by summarily denying the motion because: (1) counsel had a valid reason to object to the court's misstatement that it lacked authority to order concurrent sentencing; and (2) the sentence is illegal because trial courts cannot delegate sentencing authority to administrative agencies.
[1] A trial court cannot delegate its sentencing authority to an administrative agency.
[2] A trial court must exercise its discretion to order a sentence imposed for an offense committed while on community release to run concurrent or consecutive to the communi…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The law is clear that a trial court may order a sentence to run concurrently or consecutively to a pending control-release violation. Scantling v. State, 711 So.2d 524, 525-26 (Fla.1998).”
Establishes that trial courts have authority to determine concurrent versus consecutive sentencing, contradicting the trial court's delegation to the Department of Corrections.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn January 14, 2005, Richardson pleaded no contest to child abuse and was sentenced to fifteen months' imprisonment. At sentencing, counsel argued tha…
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PER CURIAM.
The appellant challenges the trial court’s summary denial of his motion for postcon-viction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Because the appellant raises facially sufficient claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and illegal sentence, we reverse.
On January 14, 2005, the appellant pled no contest to child abuse and was sentenced to fifteen months’ imprisonment pursuant to a plea agreement. During the sentencing hearing, counsel argued that the state did not have any objection to running the sentence concurrently with the appellant’s sentence for violating his control-release, but it would be up to the Department of Corrections to determine whether the sentences would be concurrent or consecutive.
The trial court agreed with this argument and stated that it could not order the sentences to run concurrently to each other. The appellant filed a timely rule 3.850 motion, which was summarily denied by the trial court, arguing that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s misstatement of the law and that his sentence was illegal. The law is clear that a trial court may order a sentence to run concurrently or consecutively to a pending control-release violation. Scantling v. State, 711 So. 2d 524, 525-26 (Fla.1998).
In fact, the trial court must exercise its discretion to order a sentence imposed for an offense committed while on community release concurrent or consecutive to his or her community release sentence and cannot defer the structure of the sentence to the Department of Corrections because the Department lacks such sentencing authority. § 921.16(1), Fla. Stat. (2004); Byrd, v. State, 853 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); McCarthur v. State, 766 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)(holding that the trial court must exercise its discretion to sentence the offender to concurrent or consecutive sentences); Art. I, § 18, Fla. Const, (barring an administrative agency from imposing a sentence of imprisonment); Pearson v. Moore, 767 So. 2d 1235, 1238-39 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)(holding that the power to sentence rests entirely with the courts), affirmed, 767 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).
Therefore, the appellant has stated a valid reason for his counsel to object.
Additionally, the appellant’s sentence is illegal because the recommended sentence is of such a nature that it imposes a kind of punishment that no judge under the entire body of sentencing statutes could possibly inflict under any set of factual circumstances, Carter v. State, 786 So. 2d 1173, 1181 (Fla.2001)(defining an illegal sentence), as a trial court cannot delegate sentencing authority to an administrative agency. See Art. I, § 18, Fla. Const.; Pearson v. Moore, 767 So. 2d at 1238-39.
Thus, it appears the appellant is serving an illegal sentence. Cf. Krause v. State, 857 So. 2d 343, 343 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)(remanding a summarily denied rule 3.800(a) motion to the trial court to exercise its discretion to award or deny foreign jail credit which is a discretionary decision). Because the trial court erred by summarily denying the appellant’s motion for the above reason, we reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
BARFIELD and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur, and THOMAS, J., concurs in result only.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Bivins v. State, 35 So. 3d 67 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)…nce Mr. Bivins concurrently with any sentence imposed in any other case.” Before the direct appeal, appellate counsel filed a motion to correct sentencing error, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(b)(2). Citing Richardson v. State, 947 So. 2d 1219, 1221 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007), appellant argued that the sentencing court failed to “exercise its discretion to order a sentence imposed for an offense committed while on community release concurrent or consecutive to [the] community release sentence.”…
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Shorter v. State, 113 So. 3d 940 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013)…such a sentence. See Scantling v. State, 711 So. 2d 524, 525-26 (Fla.1998) (holding that trial court could impose new sentence consecutive to prior sentence, despite pending control release violation related to prior sentence); Richardson v. State, 947 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (recognizing that court is under a duty to exercise its discretion to order sentence to run concurrently or consecutively to prior sentence, despite pending control release violation). It is very clear that the lawyers and the c…
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Widemond v. State, 27 So. 3d 162 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)…e the sentence in this case concurrently to his conditional release sentence, and the record clearly demonstrates that the trial court would have imposed the sentences concurrently had it been aware of its authority to do so. In Richardson v. State, 947 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007), a defendant filed a 3.850 motion asserting that counsel was ineffective for advising him that the trial court had no authority to run his sentence concurrently to a conditional-release sentence. Id. at 1220. The trial court agre…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Carter v. State, 786 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 2001)
- Pearson v. Moore, 767 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)
- Teayoir Scantling v. State, 711 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 1998)
- Krause v. State, 857 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)
- McCARTHUR v. State, 766 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
- Byrd v. State, 853 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)