JACK BESONER & ASSOCIATES
v.
SQUARCIA
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A court reporter sued an attorney for payment of transcript preparation services rendered in a divorce case. The court held that the attorney's request to delay transcription and discuss compensation with his client constituted notice that the attorney was disclaiming personal liability, limiting the reporter's recovery to the per diem attendance fee rather than the full transcript preparation cost.
The court held that the attorney's request to delay transcription and discuss compensation with his client constituted sufficient notice that the attorney was disclaiming personal responsibility as agent, limiting the reporter's recovery to the per diem attendance fee and requiring the reporter to look to the attorney's client for any additional compensation.
[1] An administrative rule or internal court policy does not constitute a part of a contract, express or implied, for services rendered by a court reporter to an attorney.
[2] An attorney's request for a delay in transcribing testimony, coupled with a desire to discuss compensation with their client, may constitute notice that the attorney will…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the court concludes that an administrative rule or internal court policy in reference to a mandatory transcript of testimony in divorce actions does not constitute a part of the contract, express or implied, for services of a reporter by the attorney for the plaintiff in the case”
Establishes that court policy alone does not create contractual obligations between attorney and reporter
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn attorney employed a court reporter to report testimony at a final hearing in a divorce action on September 23, 1968. After the hearing, the attorne…
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Final judgment is rendered for the plaintiff in the sum of $40, plus $12.41 court costs.
The issue herein is governed by the general rule of law determining the liability of an agent for a disclosed principal.
The material facts are uncontroverted. Defendant attorney employed plaintiff to report the testimony at a final hearing in a divorce action pending in the circuit court, Judge Harold Vann’s division. Shortly after the final hearing defendant requested plaintiff to delay the transcribing of the testimony until he could discuss the matter of compensation for such services with his client, the plaintiff in the case, who was hospitalized with a serious illness.
In the divorce action Judge Vann entered an order dated January 12, 1970 directing defendant’s client, Donald E. Holliday, plaintiff therein, to pay the court reporter within 30 days. The final hearing took place on September 23, 1968, and the testimony was transcribed on or about November 14, 1968.
Judge Vann testified by deposition in the instant action (plaintiff’s exhibit 1) on March 19, 1970, that it was his policy to require a transcript of the testimony at the final hearing prepared and filed by the court reporter.
Plaintiff’s claim is based upon the services rendered in preparing and filing the transcript in compliance with Judge Vann’s court policy.
Plaintiff does not deny that the attorney for plaintiff in the divorce action (defendant herein) requested plaintiff not to transcribe the testimony because his client was seriously ill in the hospital and that he wanted to discuss the matter with him.
The court concludes that an administrative rule or internal court policy in reference to a mandatory transcript of testimony in divorce actions does not constitute a part of the contract, express or implied, for services of a reporter by the attorney for the plaintiff in the case. In this case the attorney’s request for a delay in transcribing the testimony was in effect a direction to the plaintiff that the attorney would not be personally obligated, and constituted notice *148to the court reporter that he would have to look to defendant’s client for his fee if he transcribed the testimony contrary to his request to refrain until the matter could be resolved with his client.
Under the circumstances of the case plaintiff could not rely upon the general rule holding an attorney liable for an obligation incurred as agent for an undisclosed principal. Here, there was sufficient notice to the court reporter that the attorney was disclaiming responsibility as agent until he could clear the matter of payment with his client. From that moment on the court reporter was under a duty to inquire and to look to the litigant (defendant’s client) for payment.
On the basis of the foregoing plaintiff’s recovery is limited to the per diem attendance fee at the divorce hearing.