WILSON CROSBY, PETITIONER,
v.
FLORIDA PAROLE COMMISSION, RESPONDENT

Fla. 1st DCA | 2007-03-02
No. 1D06-2743
BROWNING, C.J., WEBSTER and PADOVANO, JJ., concur.
949 So. 2d 1181 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2007) Caution
Cited by 22 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Wilson Crosby sought certiorari review of a circuit court's denial of his mandamus petition challenging the Florida Parole Commission's revocation of his conditional release supervision. The appellate court granted the petition, finding that the circuit court failed to apply the correct legal standard requiring proof that any violation was both willful and substantial, and also improperly imposed a lien on his inmate trust account for court costs.


Holding

The court held that the circuit court's review was deficient because it did not clearly determine whether the violation was willful as required by law, thus failing to observe the essential requirements of law. The court also held that the circuit court lacked statutory authority to impose a lien on Crosby's inmate trust account for court costs because the collateral criminal proceeding falls under section 57.085(10), Florida Statutes, which does not authorize such liens.


Headnotes

[1] A revocation of supervised release requires proof that the violation of a condition of supervision was both willful and substantial.

[2] A circuit court cannot review a revocation of supervised release if the record does not clearly indicate whether the violation was found to be willful.

Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“To support a revocation of supervised release, the state must prove that a violation of a condition of supervision was both willful and substantial.”

Establishes the legal standard for parole/supervised release revocation requiring both willfulness and substantiality

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

Crosby was on conditional release supervision. The Florida Parole Commission revoked his conditional release based on a finding that he failed to repo…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner seeks certiorari review of the denial of a petition for writ of mandamus which challenged the Florida Parole Commission’s decision to revoke his conditional release supervision. Review is sought pursuant to Sheley v. Florida Parole Comm’n, 703 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), approved, 720 So. 2d 216 (Fla.1998) (holding that at this stage of the proceedings, review is limited to a determination of whether the circuit court afforded due process and whether the court observed the essential requirements of law). We grant the petition.

To support a revocation of supervised release, the state must prove that a violation of a condition of supervision was both willful and substantial. See State v. Carter, 835 So. 2d 259, 262 (Fla.2002); Ellis v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 911 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). In addition, the finder of fact must make a determination that the violation was both willful and substantial. See Mathis v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 944 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). Here, although the hearing examiner found petitioner guilty of failing to report to the probation office as instructed, it was not clear from either the hearing examiner’s records or the Parole Commission’s order of revocation whether the violation was found to be willful.

Accordingly, the circuit court could not have reviewed the proceedings and determined that they were supported by competent substantial evidence in the record and, because the circuit court could not apply the correct law, it could not have observed the essential requirements of law. Id.

Petitioner also challenges the imposition of a lien on his inmate trust account for payment of court costs and fees. Because the underlying action constitutes a “collateral criminal proceeding” pursuant to section 57.085(10), Florida Statutes (2005), there is no statutory authority for the circuit court to impose a lien to recover costs and fees. See Brooks v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 948 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Spaziano v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, — So. 2d —, 2006 WL 1565289 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Cox v. Crosby, 31 Fla.

L. Weekly D310, — So. 2d —, 2006 WL 176681 (Fla. 1st DCA Jan.26, 2006), rev. granted sub nom., McDonough v. Cox, 924 So. 2d 809 (Fla.2006); see also Schmidt v. Crusoe, 878 So. 2d 361 (Fla.2003). We accordingly quash that portion of the circuit court’s order on indigency imposing a lien as a result of petitioner’s filing the petition for writ of mandamus.

The circuit court should direct the reimbursement of any funds that have been withdrawn from petitioner’s account to satisfy the improper lien order. The petition for writ of certiorari is GRANTED and the final order of the circuit court is quashed. In addition, that portion of the circuit court’s order on indi-gency imposing a lien is quashed. This cause is hereby REMANDED.

BROWNING, C.J., WEBSTER and PADOVANO, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (11 total)

  • Houck v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 953 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)
    …dence in the record and, because the circuit court could not apply the correct law, it could not have observed the essential requirements of law. Id.; Williams v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 949 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); Crosby v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 949 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). The petition for writ of certiorari is GRANTED and the final order of the circuit court is quashed. This cause is hereby REMANDED. BARFIELD, WOLF, and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur.…
  • Crosby v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 975 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)
    …xaminer’s records or the Parole Commission’s revocation order whether the violation was found to be willful, the circuit court could not have reviewed the matter in accordance with the essential requirements of law. See Crosby v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 949 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). Accordingly, the circuit court’s order was quashed, the matter was remanded, and the circuit court in turn remanded the matter to the Parole Commission - to determine whether Crosby’s violation was willful and substantial. Based…
  • Johnson v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 958 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)
    …correct law, it could not have observed the essential requirements of the law. Accord Houck v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 958 So. 2d 692 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); Williams v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 949 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); Crosby v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 949 So. 2d 1181 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). Accordingly, we grant the petition, quash the circuit court’s order and remand for further proceedings. PETITION GRANTED. KAHN, LEWIS, and HAWKES, JJ„ concur.…

Previewing 3 of 11 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw