LUIS TEJERA, APPELLANT,

v.

BUDGET GROUP, INC., AND CNA CLAIMS PLUS, APPELLEES

Citator

Cited By

• Amec Civil, LLC v. State, 41 So. 3d 235 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)
  …See also Saadeh v. Stanton Rowing Found., Inc., 912 So. 2d 28, 31 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (noting that “[r]es judicata extends only to the facts and conditions as they existed at the time the prior court rendered the prior judgment”); Hicks v. Hoagland, 953 So. 2d 695, 698 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (holding that the “record also establishes identity of cause of action. The facts and issues supporting the underlying transaction — a $2.5 million promissory note executed in June 1998 and the alleged default in 2001— exist…
• Bradenton Grp., Inc. v. State, 970 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)
  …ummary judgment is de novo. Major League Baseball v. Morsani 790 So. 2d 1071, 1074 (Fla.2001). “[C]ollateral estoppel prevents identical parties from relitigating identical issues that have been determined in a prior litigation.” Hicks v. Hoagland, 953 So. 2d 695, 698 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (citing Burns v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 914 So. 2d 451, 453 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)). “Collateral estoppel is a judicial doctrine which in general terms prevents identical parties from relitigating the same issues that have al…
• Wilmington Tr. v. Rolland A. Moon, 238 So. 3d 425 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)
  …to the material facts; only after the moving party has tendered competent evidence supporting its motion does the burden shift to the other party to come forward with counterevidence that establishes a question of material fact. Hicks v. Hoagland , 953 So. 2d 695, 697 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). Because summary judgment is not a substitute for trial, when a defendant moves for summary judgment, the court is not called upon to determine whether the plaintiff can actually prove its cause of action; rather, the court'…

Authorities Cited

• Floyd v. Burnham, 889 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)