ALVIN A. CLAYTON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that a Nelson hearing was unnecessary, a motion to withdraw a plea lacked merit, and Blakely/Apprendi did not require a jury determination for habitual offender status.
[1] A Nelson hearing is not required when a defendant expresses only general dissatisfaction with counsel and does not raise specific allegations of incompetence.
[2] A court is not required to hold a hearing on a motion to withdraw a plea if the motion lacks merit.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe defendant appealed his convictions and sentences, arguing the trial court erred by not holding a Nelson hearing, not holding a hearing on his moti…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Nelson Hearing cases and more on FLexlaw
ORFINGER, J.
Alvin A. Clayton appeals his convictions and sentences for numerous offenses, arguing that the trial court erred by (1) failing to conduct a Nelson1 hearing; (2) failing to hold a hearing on his motion to withdraw his plea filed before sentencing; and (3) sentencing him as a habitual felony offender. We find no error and affirm.
As to his first point, we conclude that a Nelson hearing was unnecessary because Mr. Clayton expressed only general dissatisfaction with his counsel, and did not raise specific allegations of attorney incompetence sufficient to warrant such an inquiry. See Wilson v. State, 889 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004). As to his second point, we conclude that the court did not err in failing to conduct a meaningful hearing on Mr. Clayton’s pro se motion to withdraw his plea because the motion lacked merit. Mr. Clayton premised his motion on his belief that he was entitled to be discharged on speedy trial grounds. In his discharge motion (which he filed as a petition for writ of habeas corpus), he alleged that he was continuously available for trial during the requisite time period. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.191. However, the record belies that allegation, and, instead, demonstrates that Mr. Clayton waived speedy trial at least twice, once on September 14, 2000, when he failed to appear at trial, and again on November 6, 2002, when his attorney filed a written motion for continuance.
Finally, Mr. Clayton’s contention that Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), mandated that he had a right to a jury determination as to his qualification to be sentenced as a habitual offender was resolved contrary to his contention by this Court in Frumenti v. State, 885 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004).
For these reasons, we affirm Mr. Clayton’s convictions and sentences.
AFFIRMED.
GRIFFIN and LAWSON, JJ., concur. . Nelson v. State, 274 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (U.S. 2000)
- Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (U.S. 2004)
- Nelson v. State, 274 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973)
- Frumenti v. State, 885 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)
- Laron A. Mingo v. State, 889 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)