CHRISTOPHER MCMANN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Christopher McMann appeals his conviction for failing to register as a sexual offender every six months, arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss. The appellate court affirmed, holding that although McMann did not qualify as a sexual offender under section 943.0435 (since he was on probation), he did qualify under section 944.607, and the State's citation error in the charging document was harmless.
McMann did not qualify as a sexual offender under section 943.0435 because he was on probation, but he did qualify under section 944.607. Although the State erred in citing section 943.0435(14)(a) instead of section 944.607(13)(a), the error was harmless because both provisions contain identical reporting language and McMann suffered no prejudice from the citation error.
[1] A person on probation for an enumerated offense does not qualify as a "sexual offender" under section 943.0435(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2005), which defines a sexual of…
[2] A person in the custody or control of, or under the supervision of, the department or in the custody of a private correctional facility qualifies as a "sexual offender" u…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We agree with Appellant that he did not qualify as a sexual offender under section 943.0435 because he was on probation... However, Appellant did qualify as a sexual offender under section 944.607, Florida Statutes (2005).”
Establishes that McMann qualified under one statute but not the other, addressing the core legal issue.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMcMann was charged with failing to report every six months to the county sheriff's office as required of sexual offenders. McMann was on probation at …
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Christopher McMann, appeals his judgment and sentence and argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge of failing to report every six months to the county sheriffs office in violation of section 943.0435(14)(a), Florida Statutes (2005). We agree with Appellant that he did not qualify as a sexual offender under section 943.0435 because he was on probation. See § 943.0435(l)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (2005) (defining a “sexual offender,” as that term is used in section 943.0435, as a person who has been released on or after October 1, 1997, from the sanction imposed for an enumerated offense and providing that a sanction includes but is not limited to probation); see also Grumet v. State, 771 So. 2d 39, 42 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). However, Appellant did qualify as a sexual offender under section 944.607, Florida Statutes (2005). See § 944.607(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005) (defining “sexual offender,” as that term is used in section 944.607, as a person who is in the custody or control of, or under the supervision of, the department or is in the custody of a private correctional facility); see also Grumet, 771 So. 2d at 42.
Importantly, section 944.607(13)(a) has the same reporting requirement as does section 943.0435(14)(a) and contains identical language. While the State properly included the language of section 944.607(13)(a) in the charging document, it erred in citing section 943.0435(14)(a). However, an “[e]rror in or omission of the citation [in the charging document] shall not be ground for dismissing the count or for a reversal of a conviction based thereon if the error or omission did not mislead the defendant to the defendant’s prejudice.” Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.140(d)(1). Appellant has neither alleged nor demonstrated that the State’s error misled him to his prejudice.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
WOLF, DAVIS, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
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Gerren Joseph Washington v. State, 228 So. 3d 707 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017)…), and even a charging document’s error in citation “shall not be ground for dismissing the count or for a reversal of a conviction based. thereon if the error or omission did not mislead the defendant to the defendant’s prejudice.” McMann v. State, 954 So. 2d 90, 91 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (quoting Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.140(d)(1)). It was clear in this case to all parties and the court that the alleged violation was for Washington being away from his approved residence, a violation of condition 16. Thus, we affir…
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Keandre Dashawn Ivory v. State (Fla. 2d DCA 2024)…t or for a reversal of a conviction based thereon if the error or omission did not mislead the defendant to the defendant's prejudice.' " (first citing Hollingshead v. State, 846 So. 2d 627, 629 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); and then quoting McMann v. State, 954 So. 2d 90, 91 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007))). Therefore, we affirm the order of revocation and sentence in each case but remand for the circuit court to correct the revocation order entered in case no. 14-15318-CF to reflect that Ivory was found to be in violation of…
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State v. Haubrick, 997 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)…y abused its discretion by granting the motion to dismiss the amended information without allowing the state to correct the scrivener’s error in the statutory citation, contrary to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.140(d)(1). See McMann v. State, 954 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); Johnson v. State, 598 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). On July 14, 2008, appellees filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as moot. We find the motion to be without merit. The motion is therefore DENIED, the trial court’s order dis…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Grumet v. State, 771 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)