SCOTT WIBBENS, PETITIONER,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, BUREAU OF DRIVER IMPROVEMENT, RESPONDENT
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Scott Wibbens sought a writ of mandamus challenging the Circuit Court's dismissal of his certiorari petition contesting a driver's license suspension. The Florida First DCA held that the suspension order had not been properly rendered under the Department's rule because the driver license record lacked an entry reflecting when the order was mailed to Wibbens, and therefore the 30-day filing deadline for certiorari had not commenced.
The court held that the suspension order had not been properly rendered under the Department's rule because the driver license record must contain an entry reflecting when the order was mailed to the licensee, not merely a date when the order was signed or rendered. Therefore, the time for seeking review had not commenced, and the circuit court correctly dismissed the certiorari petition, although for the wrong reason.
[1] A certiorari petition must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order sought to be reviewed, and this time limit is jurisdictional.
[2] The date of rendition of a final order by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles is the date of mailing entered on the driver license record.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.100(c)(1) provides that a certiorari petition must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order sought to be reviewed. This time limit is jurisdictional and failure to meet it will result in dismissal of the petition.”
Establishes the jurisdictional nature of the 30-day filing deadline for certiorari petitions
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles issued a driver's license suspension order signed on October 3, 2006, which was mailed to Wibbens …
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PER CURIAM.
Scott Wibbens petitions this court for a writ of mandamus, complaining that the Circuit Court for Duval County improperly dismissed his certiorari petition. We have jurisdiction in accordance with Griffin v. Sistuenck, 816 So. 2d 600 (Fla.2002).
Wibbens’ certiorari petition challenged an order of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles which suspended his driver’s license. At issue is the timeliness of the certiorari petition. The department’s order was signed and dated by the hearing officer who issued it on October 3, 2006. The certiorari petition was filed with the circuit court on November 3, 2006, thirty-one days later. Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.100(c)(1) provides that a certiorari petition must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order sought to be reviewed. This time limit is jurisdictional and failure to meet it will result in dismissal of the petition. Hofer v. Gil De Rubio, 409 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). Thus, the date of rendition of the order must be established in order to ascertain whether the circuit court’s jurisdiction was timely invoked.
The department’s own rule, FAC Rule 15A-6.013(12), provides that “the date of rendition of a final order shall be the date of mailing entered on the driver license record.” Wibbens attached to his motion for rehearing in the circuit court a copy of an envelope which provided prima facie evidence that the order was mailed to him on October 4, 2006. Neither party provided the circuit court with any evidence of when such mailing was entered on Wib-bens’ driver license record, although two different versions of petitioner’s record are now before this court as inclusions in the parties’ appendices. One makes no mention of the order in question. The other, a more complete record, contains an entry of October 3, 2006, which simply states “final order of suspension rendered” on that date. The department relies on this version of Wibbens’ driver record to argue that the certiorari petition was untimely and correctly dismissed.
In this court’s view, the entry described above is not conclusive of the matter. To comply with the department’s rule, the driver license record must reflect a date when the order is mailed to the licensee. A docket entry which states that an order was rendered on a particular date is insufficient. Instead, the entry must describe a particular action, such as filing of the order with the clerk or, as in this case, mailing of the order to the parties.1 The appellate tribunal, as arbiter of its own jurisdiction, must determine when the lower tribunal’s order was rendered.
Upon consideration of the above, we find that the order suspending Wibbens’ license has not yet been rendered as that term is defined by the department’s rule. Thus, the time for review of that order has not yet begun and there is no rendered order for the circuit court to review. Mitchell v. Leon County Sch. Bd., 591 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); see also Sibley v. State, 876 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004); Burkette v. Sharp, 752 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). The circuit court therefore correctly dismissed the certiorari petition, although for the wrong reason. The petition for writ of mandamus must accordingly be denied, but this disposition is without prejudice to petitioner’s right to seek review in the circuit court once the order has been properly rendered by the making of an entry in his drivers license record that the order was mailed to him. The department must give Wibbens notice of such entry in order to comply with due process. Finally, we note that our holding today does not result in invalidation of a multitude of departmental orders. See Latin Express Serv., Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 660 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
PETITION DENIED.
BROWNING, C.J., KAHN, and LEWIS, JJ., concur. . Mailing of the order to the parties is rendition in workers' compensation proceedings. Fla. R.App. P. 9.180(b)(3).
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Miccosukee Tribe OF Indians OF Florida v. Lewis, 122 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013)…urisdictional. § 59.081(2), Fla. Stat. (2013) (providing that failure to timely invoke the jurisdiction of a reviewing court “shall divest such court of jurisdiction to review such cause”); Wibbens v. State, Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 956 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); Hofer v. Gil De Rubio, 409 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.020(f) provides that “an order is rendered when a signed, written order is filed with the clerk of the lower tribunal.” In their…
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Kelvone A. Williams v. Lomeli (Fla. 5th DCA 2023)…R. App. P. 9.100(c)(1). This thirty-day time limit is jurisdictional such that the failure to timely file the petition requires a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. See Wibbens v. State, Dep’t of High. Saf. & Motor Veh., Bureau of Driver Impv’t, 956 So. 2d 503, 504 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (citing Hofer v. Gil De Rubio, 409 So. 2d 527, 528 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)). The order entered here granting intervention is a nonfinal order. A motion for rehearing directed to such an order does not toll the time for filin…
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Johnson v. Snyder (Fla. 1st DCA 2020)…226, 1228 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (holding that the thirty-day time limit for filing a certiorari petition is jurisdictional and not merely a matter of procedure); Wibbens v. State, Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, Bureau of Driver Improvement, 956 So. 2d 503, 504 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (same). Although Petitioner claims that his petition was timely because it was filed fewer than thirty days after rendition of the trial court’s order denying Petitioner’s motion to strike the intervenor’s pleading, this ass…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Griffin v. D.R. Sistuenck, 816 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 2002)
- Patt v. State, 876 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)
- Litem v. Maritz GIL DE Rubio and Ferdinand Gil De Rubio, 409 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
- Emil Albert Dealto v. The Honorable Richard B. Keating, 409 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
- Sibley v. State, 876 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)
- Latin Express Serv., Inc. v. State, 660 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- Mitchell v. Leon Cnty. Sch. Bd., 591 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Burkette v. Sharp, 752 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)