JERRY A. RIDLEY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Ridley appeals a misdemeanor sentence and cost order following remand from his first appeal, which had reversed only his habitual offender sentences on felony convictions. The court holds that the misdemeanor sentence and cost order were not within the scope of the first reversal and remand and thus became final, and Ridley failed to timely seek modification under Rule 3.800(c).
The court affirms the misdemeanor sentence and cost order. Those sentences became final on the date of the mandate in the first appeal and were not within the scope of the reversal and remand. The circuit court lacked jurisdiction to revisit them absent a rule or statute permitting modification, and Ridley failed to file a timely motion under Rule 3.800(c) to seek modification within sixty days of the mandate.
[1] A trial court lacks jurisdiction to revisit matters not within the scope of a prior appellate court's reversal and remand order.
[2] A misdemeanor sentence and cost order become final on the date of an appellate court's mandate, absent specific rule or statutory authorization for modification.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Thus, our reversal and remand involved only Ridley's habitual offender sentences for the felony convictions.”
Establishes the limited scope of the first appeal's reversal, excluding the misdemeanor sentence and cost order.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 2003, Ridley pleaded no contest to two felony charges and one misdemeanor charge. He was convicted and sentenced. In his first appeal, the court re…
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NORTHCUTT, Judge.
Jerry Ridley challenges a sentence for a misdemeanor conviction and a cost order imposed after our reversal and remand in his first appeal in this case. See Ridley v. State, 911 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). In 2003, Ridley pleaded no contest to two felony charges and one misdemeanor charge and was convicted and sentenced. In Ridley’s first appeal we reversed the habitual offender sentences imposed for the felonies because it was not clear from the record that he qualified as a habitual offender. Because Ridley had not challenged the propriety of his habitual offender designation at sentencing, we remanded to allow the State to present evidence on this issue, and for the court to determine whether the habitual offender sentences were proper. Id. at 218.
Thus, our reversal and remand involved only Ridley’s habitual offender sentences for the felony convictions.
In this appeal, Ridley does not contest the sentences imposed on remand for the felonies, but instead he challenges his sentence for the misdemeanor conviction and a cost order. That sentence and the cost order became final on the date of our mandate in the first appeal, October 20, 2005. We recognize that, on remand, the circuit court purported to reimpose the original sentence for the misdemeanor conviction and to waive the costs that had been imposed at the first sentencing hearing. But that sentence and the cost order were not within the scope of our reversal and remand. The court had no jurisdiction to revisit those matters absent some rule or statute that would allow it to do so. See Kippy Corp. v. Colburn, 177 So. 2d 193 (Fla.1965); Rodriguez v. State, 441 So. 2d 1129, 1140 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (Baskin, J., dissenting).
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(c) would have permitted Ridley to seek a modification of his sentence within sixty days of the date of our mandate in his first appeal, but he did not do so. See Seward v. State, 912 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).
Accordingly, we affirm. The misdemeanor sentence and the cost order imposed at Ridley’s original sentencing hearing, which were affirmed when the mandate issued in his first appeal, remain in effect.
ALTENBERND and LaROSE, JJ., Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- The Kippy Corp. v. Sherwood Colburn, 177 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1965)
- Gregorio Rodriguez v. State, 441 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Seward v. State, 912 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)
- Ridley v. State, 911 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)