MARY E. WARD, PATERNAL GRANDMOTHER, APPELLANT,
v.
MARY TYLER BRAGG, FORMER WIFE, AND CALVIN MICHAEL WARD, FORMER HUSBAND, APPELLEES
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The court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the final judgment was nonfinal, as it reserved jurisdiction over the integrally related issue of visitation, and the motion for rehearing did not suspend rendition of a nonfinal order.
An appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction when the final judgment is nonfinal because it reserves jurisdiction over an integrally related issue.
[1] A final judgment in a custody matter that reserves jurisdiction over an integrally related issue of visitation remains nonfinal and not appealable until that issue is res…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMary E. Ward, a paternal grandmother, appealed a July 27, 2006 final judgment that modified a custody order but reserved jurisdiction to consider the …
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PER CURIAM.
Having considered Appellant’s response to this Court’s order dated February 8, 2007, as well as Appellee’s reply thereto and the attached documents, this appeal is hereby dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The December 19, 2006, order on appeal contemplates an additional hearing on the issue of visitation and is merely an interlocutory preliminary order that will eventually culminate in an appealable final order. Further, the Final Judgment, entered on July 27, 2006, which modified a previously entered custody order, is nonfinal because it reserved jurisdiction to consider the integrally related issue of visitation. See T.H. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 736 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). Finally, Appellant’s argument that her motion for rehearing suspended rendition of the Final Judgment is without merit. Appellant’s reliance on this Court’s opinion in Johnson v. Johnson, 902 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), is misplaced because Johnson did not involve a nonfinal order. Therefore, the motion for rehearing directed towards the final order in Johnson was an authorized motion. Conversely, Appellant’s motion for rehearing in this case was not authorized because it was directed towards a nonfinal order. Wagner v. Bieley, Wagner & Assocs., Inc., 263 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1972). Therefore, it did not suspend rendition. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.020(h).
Appellant’s Motion for Relief, filed in this Court on February 1, 2007, is hereby denied as moot.
BROWNING, C.J., KAHN, and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (13 total)
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Moore v. Rory A. Moore, 50 So. 3d 110 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)…hedule for the third child and no subsequent order adopting a parenting plan for the third child has been filed in this case. The issue of time sharing is integrally related to other issues concerning the parties minor children. See Ward v. Bragg, 957 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). A judgment that reserves jurisdiction over an integrally related issue is not a final appealable order. See id.; Hoffman v. O’Connor, 802 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002); T.H. v. Department of Children and Families, 736 So. 2d 1…
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Mohamed EL Gohary v. EL Gohary, 76 So. 3d 355 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)…(Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (holding that a final judgment of dissolution that dissolved the parties’ marriage and resolved most of the issues but reserved jurisdiction to enter a parenting plan for one of three minor children was nonfinal); Ward v. Bragg, 957 So. 2d 670, 670-71 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (holding that an order modifying a child custody award was “nonfinal because it reserved jurisdiction to consider the integrally related issue of visitation”). Because the Final Judgment of Dissolution was not a final or…
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Cassell v. Eugenio Erquiaga, 28 So. 3d 143 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)…a. R.App. P. Further, appellant’s argument that her motion for rehearing suspended rendition of the March 17 order is without merit. Appellant’s motion for rehearing was not authorized because it was directed toward a non-final order, Ward v. Bragg, 957 So. 2d 670, 670-71 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); Wagner v. Bieley, Wagner & Assoc., Inc., 263 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1972), and, accordingly, did not suspend rendition. See Fla.R.App. P. 9.020(h). HAWKES, C.J., WEBSTER, and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur.…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Wagner v. Bieley, 263 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1972)
- T.H. v. Dep't of Child. & Families, 736 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)
- Clemon James Johnson, Jr. v. Johnson, 902 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)