JOYCE KWIECINSKI, APPELLANT,

v.

JOHN K. RENKE, II, APPELLEE

Citator

Cited By

• G.C. v. R.S. (parent) and K.C. (minor), 71 So. 3d 164 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)
  …ever, it may be asserted as an affirmative defense to criminal child abuse charges. 828 So. 2d at 1020. The Raford court expressly recognized “a typical spanking” as “reasonable” or “non-excessive corporal punishment.” Id.; see also Czapla v. State, 957 So. 2d 676, 679-80 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (distinguishing permissible form of parental corporal punishment, (i.e. “spanking”), from abuse by a father toward his son when the father punched the child on the head for failing to do yard work, pushed him into an adjo…
• State v. Anne Lanier, 979 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)
  …was prohibited from imposing any corporal punishment. In the absence of a corporal punishment privilege, Defendant’s actions must be assessed in the same manner as those of any other non-parental (or non-in loco parentis) defendant. Czapla v. State, 957 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). That is, Defendant’s conduct is to be measured not in terms of whether her actions were “reasonable” (as the majority asserts) but whether those actions “could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to a c…
• Chisolm v. State, 58 So. 3d 304 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)
  …oes not rise to the level of felony child abuse but instead may constitute the misdemeanor of contributing to the dependency of a child under section 827.04. See King v. State, 903 So. 2d 954, 955 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). Thereafter, in Czapla v. State, 957 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007), the appellant appealed his conviction for third-degree felony child abuse, arguing, as Appellant does in this case, that, under Raford, the parental corporal punishment must be sufficiently serious to cause injury greater than s…