GENERAL CAULKING COATING CO., INC., PETITIONER,
v.
J.D. WATERPROOFING, INC., RESPONDENT
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General Caulking sought a writ of certiorari to challenge a trial court order denying its motion to quash a subpoena for trade secret information. The court held that the trial court erred by failing to conduct an in camera inspection and make findings of fact regarding whether the requested documents were trade secrets before ordering production.
The trial court departed from the essential requirements of law by ordering production of allegedly confidential trade secret information without conducting an in camera inspection and making necessary findings of fact. The court must first determine if the requested materials constitute trade secrets, and if so, must require the party seeking production to show reasonable necessity before ordering disclosure.
[1] Disclosure of trade secrets can constitute irreparable harm, justifying certiorari review of discovery orders.
[2] A trial court must determine whether requested production constitutes a trade secret before ordering its disclosure.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“When the trade secret privilege is asserted as the basis for resisting production, the trial court must determine whether the requested production constitutes a trade secret; if so, the court must require the party seeking production to show reasonable necessity for the requested materials.”
Establishes the mandatory procedural requirement for trade secret discovery disputes
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGeneral Caulking entered into a sub-contract with Bovis Lend Lease to perform waterproofing work on a Miami-Dade County construction project. J.D. Wat…
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GREEN, J.
General Caulking & Coating Co., Inc., petitions this court for a writ of certiorari to review and quash the trial court’s order denying its “Motion to Quash Subpoena or in the Alternative Motion for Protective Order.” Because we find that the trial court departed from the essential requirements of the law, by ordering production of information and documents claimed to be trade secrets without conducting the requisite in camera inspection and making the necessary findings of fact, we grant the petition and quash the order under review.
This matter arises out of a construction project located in Miami-Dade County. Bovis Lend Lease, Inc., was the general contractor on the project. Bovis negotiated with J.D. Waterproofing, Inc., for the latter to perform the waterproofing work on the project. The parties entered into a letter of intent, but never contracted for the performance of the work. Bovis subsequently entered into a sub-contract with petitioner, General Caulking, to perform the waterproofing on the project.
J.D. Waterproofing brought suit against Bovis for breach of contract. General Caulking is not a party in the lower court action. Subsequently, J.D. Waterproofing served General Caulking with a subpoena duces tecum requesting, among other things, the bid and payment information for the project. General Caulking filed its Motion to Quash Subpoena or in the Alternative Motion for Protective Order asserting that the subpoena sought confidential business and trade secret information. The trial court heard General Caulking’s motion during motion calendar, and summarily denied the same. This petition followed:
It is a well-established principle of procedure that:
[w]hen the trade secret privilege is asserted as the basis for resisting production, the trial court must determine whether the requested production constitutes a trade secret; if so, the court must require the party seeking production to show reasonable necessity for the requested materials.... If production is then ordered, the court must set forth its findings.
Sheridan Healthcorp, Inc. v. Total Health Choice, Inc., 770 So. 2d 221, 222 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), (citing Rare Coin-it, Inc. v. I.J.E., Inc., 625 So. 2d 1277, 1278-79 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)). Because the order under review makes no specific findings as to why it deemed the requested information not to be protected by the trade secret privilege we find that “it departs from the essential requirements of the law for which no adequate remedy may be afforded to petitioners on final review.” Arthur Finnieston, Inc. v. Pratt, 673 So. 2d 560, 562 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). Accordingly, we grant the petition for writ of certiorari, quash the order under review, and instruct the trial court to conduct an in camera inspection of the requested documents to make findings of facts determining whether the documents constitute trade secrets, and if so, whether the need for producing the documents outweighs the interest in maintaining their confidentiality. See Sheridan Healthcorp, 770 So. 2d at 223.
Certiorari granted.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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SEA Coast Fire, Inc. v. Triangle Fire, Inc., 170 So. 3d 804 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)…ed production constitutes a trade secret, determine whether there is a reasonable necessity for production; and (3) if production is ordered, the trial court must set forth its findings. Gen. Caulking Coating Co., Inc. v. J.D. Waterproofing, Inc., 958 So. 2d 507, 508 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). Trade secrets are defined in Florida’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act as: [I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process that: (a) derives independent economic value, a…
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Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Maximo Guzman Cabrera, 112 So. 3d 731 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013)…hy reasonable necessity has been demonstrated. See Arthur Finnieston, Inc. v. Pratt, 673 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); Rare Coin-It, Inc. v. I.J.E., 625 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993); see also Gen. Caulking Coating Co. v. J.D. Waterproofing, Inc., 958 So. 2d 507, 508 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (holding that once determination of reasonable necessity has been made, the trial court must set forth its findings in the order requiring production). The trial court, prior to ordering production of the documents Cooper cl…
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Osceola Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Sand Lake Surgery Ctr., LLC, 46 Fla. L. Weekly D308 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021)…ity for production; and (3) if production is ordered, the trial court must set forth its findings. Sea Coast Fire, Inc. v. Triangle Fire, Inc., 170 So. 3d 804, 807–808 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014) (citing Gen. Caulking Coating Co. v. J.D. Waterproofing Inc., 958 So. 2d 507, 508 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007)). There is no indication that the trial court followed these procedures in this case. Even if the trial court had followed the procedures described above, its order must be quashed. “The burden is on the party resisting disc…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Rare Coin-It, Inc. v. I.J.E., Inc., 625 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)
- Sheridan Healthcorp, Inc. v. Total Health Choice, Inc., 770 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)
- Arthur Fennieston, Inc. v. Pratt, 673 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)