DAVID L. HUSTAD, P.E., APPELLANT,
v.
ARCHITECTURAL STUDIO, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, D/B/A SCOTT BLAKESLEE DISHER & ASSOCIATES, APPELLEE
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David Hustad, a structural engineer, sought attorney's fees under Florida Statute § 57.105 after his former employer voluntarily dismissed its lawsuit against him. The trial court summarily denied the motion solely because there was no judgment on the merits, but the appellate court reversed, holding that a voluntary dismissal does not preclude consideration of a frivolous litigation claim.
The trial court abused its discretion by refusing to consider the § 57.105 motion merely because the lawsuit was voluntarily dismissed. A voluntary dismissal does not preclude a party from seeking and obtaining attorney's fees for frivolous litigation; the movant is entitled to present evidence demonstrating entitlement to fees even when the lawsuit is dismissed in early stages.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion by failing to consider a motion for attorney's fees under section 57.105 merely because the lawsuit has been voluntarily dismissed.
[2] Section 57.105 attorney's fees are awardable when a party knew or should have known that a claim was not supported by material facts or the application of existing law.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The failure of a trial court to consider a motion for award of section 57.105 attorney's fees merely because the lawsuit has been voluntarily dismissed is an abuse of discretion.”
Establishes the core holding that voluntary dismissal does not preclude consideration of a frivolous litigation claim.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceArchitectural Studio, Inc. (ASI) sued its former employee, structural engineer David Hustad. ASI voluntarily dismissed the suit. Hustad then filed a m…
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STEVENSON, C.J.
David L. Hustad is a structural engineer who was sued by his former employer, Architectural Studio, Inc. (“ASI”).
After ASI voluntarily dismissed its suit, appellant filed a motion seeking the award of 57.105 attorney’s fees. The attorney’s fees motion was set to be heard at a time originally reserved to resolve a pre-dismissal discovery dispute. Initially, there was some confusion between the parties and the judge as to what was to be addressed. When it became clear to the judge that the matter before him was a section 57.105 motion, he questioned how appellant’s counsel could establish ASI’s claims were frivolous from the outset, as claimed, in the wake of a voluntary dismissal. Although appellant’s counsel pointed to the nearly 120 pages of documents attached to his motion, the trial court summarily denied the motion indicating that absent a disposition on the merits, there was no way for him to know that ASI’s claims were frivolous. This was reversible error.
Section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes (2006), provides that a trial court “shall award” attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in an action where the court finds that the losing party or his attorney “knew or should have known” that the claim “[w]as not supported by the material facts necessary to establish the claim” or “[would not be supported by the application of then-existing law to those material facts.” Fees are not awardable where the claim can be supported by “a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law, as it applied to the material facts, with a reasonable expectation of success.” § 57.105(2), Fla. Stat. “[T]he mere dismissal of a suit does not necessarily justify an attorney’s fee award if the suit can be considered to have been non-frivolous at its inception.” Murphy v. WISU Props., Ltd., 895 So. 2d 1088, 1094 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004). Whether a claim is frivolous within the meaning of section 57.105, thus mandating the award of fees, is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court. See Bowen v. Brewer, 936 So. 2d 757, 762 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006), review denied, 952 So. 2d 1188 (Fla.2007); Yakavonis v. Dolphin Petroleum, Inc., 934 So. 2d 615, 618 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).
To exercise this discretion, the trial court must make “an inquiry into what the losing party knew or should have known during the fact-establishment process, both before and after suit is filed.” Bowen, 936 So. 2d at 763. Even when the lawsuit is dismissed in its early stages, the movant under section 57.105 is entitled to present evidence and establish a record for the purposes of demonstrating entitlement to attorney’s fees. The failure of a trial court to consider a motion for award of section 57.105 attorney’s fees merely because the lawsuit has been voluntarily dismissed is an abuse of discretion. We thus reverse the order appealed and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and Remanded.
POLEN and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.
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Chue v. Lehman, 21 So. 3d 890 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)…y’s fees pursuant to section 57.105(1), the trial court must make “ ‘an inquiry into what the losing party knew or should have known during the fact-establishment process, both before and after suit is filed.’ ” Hustad v. Architectural Studio, Inc., 958 So. 2d 569, 571 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (quoting Bowen v. Brewer, 936 So. 2d 757, 762 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)). To award attorney’s fees under section 57.105(1), the trial court [*892] must find that the action was “frivolous or so devoid of merit both on the facts and…
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Nasser v. Nasser, 975 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)…es. The award of attorney’s fees under section 57.105 is a matter committed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal, absent a showing of clear abuse of discretion. Hustad v. Architectural Studio, Inc., 958 So. 2d 569, 571 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); Turovets v. Khromov, 943 So. 2d 246, 248 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). No such showing is present. We have considered appellant’s claims that the trial court applied the wrong standard in considering the motion and that it incorrect…
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Dybalski v. Dybalski, 108 So. 3d 736 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013)…l court relative to this issue was that husband had withdrawn the petition, which the court equated with a voluntary dismissal. This is insufficient, standing alone, to show bad faith or other vexatious conduct. Hustad v. Architectural Studio, Inc., 958 So. 2d 569, 570 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); Arenas v. City of Coleman, 791 So. 2d 1234, 1235 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). Moreover, the claims contained in the motions do not appear frivolous, and husband offered a valid excuse for his withdrawal of the motion. There is also…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Yakavonis v. Dolphin Petroleum, Inc., 934 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)
- Murphy v. Wisu Props., Ltd., 895 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004)
- Slate v. Rice, 936 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)