BRUCE SLACK, APPELLANT,
v.
JEAN-MICHEL KLING, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that two voicemails left by the appellant did not constitute acts of repeat violence as defined by statute, because they would not cause substantial emotional distress to a reasonable person.
The appellant left two voicemails for the petitioner, stating he would make an 'arrangement' if the petitioner did not stay away from the appellant's …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Stalking Definition cases and more on FLexlaw
WHATLEY, Judge.
Bruce Slack appeals a final judgment of injunction for protection against repeat violence. He contends that there was no evidence establishing acts of repeat violence as defined in section 784.046, Florida Statutes (1997). We agree and reverse.
Section 784.046 provides that a person may obtain an injunction for protection in cases involving repeat violence. Repeat violence is defined as two incidents of stalking or violence.1 § 784.046(1). A person commits the act of stalking when they “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly” follow or harass another person. § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2006). The term “harass” is defined in section 784.048(1) as engaging in a series of acts over a period of time “directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose.” In determining if an incident causes substantial emotional distress, courts use a reasonable person standard, not a subjective standard. Ravitch v. Whelan, 851 So. 2d 271, 273 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); McMath v. Biernacki, 776 So. 2d 1039, 1040 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).
In the present case, Kling testified regarding two phone calls he received from Slack which served no legitimate purpose. Kling testified that on February 25, 2006, and June 15, 2006, Slack left a voice message stating that if Kling did not stay away from Slack’s wife, Slack would make an “arrangement.”2 We conclude that nothing in the record demonstrates any basis for finding that a reasonable person would suffer “substantial emotional distress” from these two phone messages. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting the injunction.
Reversed.
CASANUEVA, J., concurs.
FULMER, C.J., concurs with opinion.
. There were no allegations that Slack committed an act of violence.
. Slack denied making these statements to Kling.
FULMER, Chief Judge,
concurring.
I agree that the trial court erred in granting the injunction. At the hearing on the petition, Kling’s testimony encompassed more than the two voice messages described in the majority opinion. However, at the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court announced, “I do find that the two acts do meet the terms and conditions of stalking. I do order the injunction.” No further explanation of the ruling was given. A review of the hearing transcript makes clear that the two acts referred to are the two voice messages described in the majority opinion. It is, therefore, unnecessary to discuss the other testimony presented, which, in any event, does not provide a sufficient basis for the issuance of an injunction.
In my view, the trial court erred because a single voice message does not meet the definition of stalking, two incidents of which are required for issuance of an injunction for repeat violence. The definition of stalking requires that a person “willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follow [ ], harass [ ], or cyberstalk [ ] another person.” § 784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2006).
Kling does not allege that he was followed or cyberstalked by Slack. The definition of harass requires that a person engage in a course of conduct involving a series of acts over a period of time. § 784.048(l)(a), (b).
A single voice message is not a course of conduct. Cf. Poindexter v. Springer, 898 So. 2d 204, 207 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (concluding that the act of mailing three letters in one envelope was insufficient to establish a course of conduct); Dudley v. Smith, 786 So. 2d 630, 631 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (concluding that at least four incidents of harassment are required before an injunction for repeat violence may be entered).
Because Kling failed to allege and prove two separate incidents of stalking, I agree that the Final Judgment should be reversed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (19 total)
-
Touhey v. Seda, 133 So. 3d 1203 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014)…te purpose”). Courts apply “ ‘a reasonable person standard, not a subjective standard,’ ” to determine whether “ ‘an incident causes substantial emotional distress.’ ” Goudy v. Duquette, 112 So. 3d 716, 717 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (quoting Slack v. Ming, 959 So. 2d 425, 426 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)). Each incident of stalking must be proven by competent, substantial evidence to support an injunction against stalking. See generally id. at 717. On October 26, 2012, Mr. Seda filed a sworn petition for injunction for prote…
-
Lukacs v. Luton, 982 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)…cher, 975 So. 2d 500, 502 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (reversing the repeat violence injunction because although one incident of stalking occurred, the second alleged incident of violence was not supported by competent, substantial evidence); Slack v. Kling, 959 So. 2d 425, 425 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (“Repeat violence is defined as two incidents of stalking or violence.”); Poindexter v. Springer, 898 So. 2d 204, 206 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (“[The appellee] did not allege an incident of violence against her; thus, for the injun…
-
Micah Jones v. Jackson, 67 So. 3d 1203 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)…ble person substantial emotional distress. See § 784.048(l)(a) (defining “harassment” as “a course of conduct directed at a specific person that causes substantial emotional distress in such person and serves no legitimate purpose”); Slack v. Kling, 959 So. 2d 425, 426 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (utilizing the reasonable person standard to determine whether the petitioner suffered substantial emotional distress). In fact, the only evidence about Mr. Jackson’s emotional response was that he “was calm” after receiving…
Previewing 3 of 19 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Menthia Faulk v. AIR Prods. & Chems., Inc., 776 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)
- Stokes v. State, 776 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)
- Ravitch v. Tess A. Whelan, 851 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003)
- Poindexter v. Springer, 898 So. 2d 204 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)
- Dudley v. Juwanna Smith, 786 So. 2d 630 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)