BOBBY BYRD, JR., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Byrd was convicted of felony driving with a suspended license as a habitual offender. On appeal, Byrd challenged the validity of the traffic stop, arguing the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, finding the officer's speed estimation and decision to stop were supported by competent evidence and not patently unreasonable.
The trial court properly found the officer's basis for suspecting Byrd of speeding was supported by competent, substantial evidence and was not patently unreasonable. Accordingly, the stop was legal, and the conviction is affirmed.
[1] An officer's estimation of a vehicle's speed, based on training and experience, can provide reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop, even if made through a rear-view mirr…
[2] A trial court's finding that an officer's suspicion of speeding was not unreasonable, supported by competent, substantial evidence, is entitled to a presumption of correc…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Appellate [*807] courts cannot use their review powers in such cases as a mechanism for reevaluating conflicting testimony and exerting covert control over the factual findings. As with all trial court rulings, a suppression ruling comes to the reviewing court clad in a presumption of correctness as to all fact-based issues”
Establishes the standard of review for suppression rulings: appellate courts presume the trial court's factual findings are correct and cannot reweigh conflicting evidence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceA 24-year veteran Florida Highway Patrol officer was on patrol late at night in Martin County on desolate roads following a hurricane. The officer obs…
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FARMER, J.
Convicted of felony driving while license suspended as a habitual offender, defendant complains on appeal that, among other things, the stop of his vehicle was improper. We disagree and affirm.
A 24-year veteran with the Florida Highway Patrol was on patrol in Martin County late at night. Owing to a hurricane, the roads were desolate, drivers few. At a turnpike overpass, she heard another vehicle approaching. Looking in her rear view mirror, she saw what proved to be defendant’s vehicle and, applying her training and experience, estimated his speed in the range of 60-65 mph in a 50 mph zone. The car braked hard when the officer’s vehicle came into view. Thinking the driver might be under the influence, she decided to follow the vehicle and then made a stop. As she approached the ear, her suspicion of impairment was dispelled. She asked for a driver’s license to make a routine check. Defendant told her his license was suspended, which she immediately verified by computer check. She cited him for driving while license suspended. Later he was charged with the crime for which he was later convicted.
Defendant argues on appeal, as he did below, that the officer had no cause to stop his vehicle, and thus any statements made after the stop should be suppressed. He voices skepticism about the officer’s testimony that through her rear-view mirror she could estimate his speed on a desolate road at night, without the ability to compare it with other vehicles, and at the top of a hill where he immediately decelerated. He also argues that his driving gave no indication of intoxication.
The trial court believed the officer’s testimony as to her reasons for suspecting him of speeding. The finding was supported by competent, substantial evidence. We cannot reweigh the evidence as to the officer’s basis for believing that defendant was speeding. See State v. Glatzmayer, 789 So .2d 297, 301 (Fla.2001) (“Appellate courts cannot use their review powers in such cases as a mechanism for reevaluating conflicting testimony and exerting covert control over the factual findings. As with all trial court rulings, a suppression ruling comes to the reviewing court clad in a presumption of correctness as to all fact-based issues, and the proper standard of review depends on the nature of the ruling in each case.”).
In applying her training and long experience, the officer is free to draw conclusions from what she has seen, so long as they are not patently unreasonable. Here they are not. The trial court having found that her conclusion was not unreasonable under the circumstances, the law is clear that the officer’s stop was legal. State v. Kindle, 782 So. 2d 971, 973 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).
Finding no merit in any other issue raised, the conviction is hereby
Affirmed.
GUNTHER and HOROWITZ, ALFRED J., Associate Judge, concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Young v. State, 33 So. 3d 151 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)…at “police may stop a vehicle for a speeding violation based on the officer’s visual or aural perceptions and that verification of actual speed by the use of radar equipment or clocking is not necessary to justify the stop”); see also Byrd v. State, 964 So. 2d 806, 806 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). We also agree with the trial court that the officer initiating the stop had a reasonable suspicion that Young had just committed a crime based upon the factors set forth in Jean v. State, 987 So. 2d 196, 198 (Fla. 4th DCA…
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State v. Dickson, 35 So. 3d 1027 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)…aken the defendant into custody in the way that they described. The court was free to make its own credibility determination, and this court is not free to reweigh the evidence. See State v. Glatzmayer, 789 So. 2d 297, 301 (Fla.2001); Byrd v. State, 964 So. 2d 806, 806-07 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). Affirmed.…
Authorities Cited
- State v. Glatzmayer, 789 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 2001)
- State v. Kindle, 782 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)