ROBIN ARNOLD, FORMER WIFE, APPELLANT,
v.
EDWARD S. ARNOLD, FORMER HUSBAND, APPELLEE
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Robin Arnold appeals a dissolution of marriage judgment that failed to distribute any portion of her ex-husband's deferred retirement option program (DROP) account as a marital asset. The court holds that benefits accrued during the marriage that give rise to DROP account rights constitute marital assets subject to equitable distribution, even if the funds are not deposited until after the marriage ends.
The court holds that all vested and nonvested benefits, rights, and funds that accrue during the marriage in deferred compensation and retirement plans, including DROP accounts, constitute marital assets that must be equitably distributed, regardless of when the funds are actually deposited into the account.
[1] A portion of a Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) account accrued during the marriage is a marital asset subject to equitable distribution.
[2] Marital assets include all vested and nonvested benefits, rights, and funds accrued during the marriage in retirement, pension, profit-sharing, annuity, deferred compensa…
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“in distributing the marital assets and liabilities between the parties, the court must begin with the premise that the distribution should be equal, unless there is a justification for an unequal distribution.”
Establishes the foundational principle of equitable distribution in Florida family law
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRobin and Edward Arnold married on February 22, 1990. Edward had been employed by the City of Pensacola Fire Department since November 7, 1977, and co…
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BENTON, J.
Robin Arnold appeals a supplemental final judgment of dissolution of marriage, asserting as error its failure to consider any part of Edward Arnold’s deferred retirement option program (DROP) account in effecting equitable distribution. We reverse and remand for equitable distribution of all marital assets, including a portion of the DROP account.
Mrs. Arnold argued below and asserts on appeal that the portion of the DROP account attributable to Mr. Arnold’s employment during them marriage — until he filed for dissolution on November 7, 2001 — is a marital asset which should have been distributed equitably. (The DROP account had accrued $95,146.43 as of September 30, 2004.) Employed by the City of Pensacola Fire Department since November 7, 1977, Mr. Ar nold was working there when the parties married on February 22, 1990, and continued to work for the City as long as the marriage lasted. After he filed the petition for dissolution, he enrolled in the DROP program on or about May 27, 2002.
Section 61.075(1), Florida Statutes (2006), provides that, “in distributing the marital assets and liabilities between the parties, the court must begin with the premise that the distribution should be equal, unless there is a justification for an unequal distribution.” Marital assets are defined by statute to include “[a]ll vested and nonvested benefits, rights, and funds accrued during the marriage in retirement, pension, profit-sharing, annuity, deferred compensation, and insurance plans and programs.” § 61.075(5)(a)(4.), Fla. Stat. (2006) (emphasis supplied).
Subsequent to the trial court’s ruling below, we decided two cases making clear that benefits giving rise to rights in a DROP account could “accrue[ ] during the marriage,” within the meaning of the statute, and therefore constitute marital assets, even though funds were not deposited in the DROP account until later. See Nix v. Nix, 930 So. 2d 711, 712 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), review dismissed, 959 So. 2d 209 (Fla.2007); Pullo v. Pullo, 926 So. 2d 448, 450 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). Although it is without precedential significance, we note that the supreme court refrained from disturbing the ruling in Nix. See 959 So. 2d 209. See also Russell v. Russell, 922 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Swanson v. Swanson, 869 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Ganzel v. Ganzel, 770 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).
Allocating DROP accounts between former spouses is closely analogous to the “deferred division of benefits on a fixed percentage basis” approach used for pensions, which was discussed with approval in DeLoach v. DeLoach, 590 So. 2d 956, 965 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), disapproved on other-grounds, Boyett v. Boyett, 703 So. 2d 451 (Fla.1997). In DROP cases, the “deferred division of benefits on a fixed percentage basis,” DeLoach, 590 So. 2d at 965, includes all associated interest and cost of living-adjustments. See Nix, 930 So. 2d at 712; Pullo, 926 So. 2d at 450-51.
For purposes of equitable distribution, each spouse has an interest in all retirement, annuity and deferred compensation benefits, including DROP accounts — or portions thereof — to which either spouse earns the right during the marriage. Such benefits are marital assets under section 61.075(5)(a), Florida Statutes (2006).
Reversed and remanded.
BROWNING, C.J., and BARFIELD, J., concur.
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Ross v. Ross, 20 So. 3d 396 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)…ed prior to the parties’ separation. Thus, the proceeds were marital assets, because the policy had been purchased with marital funds and the husband had received the proceeds prior to the filing of the dissolution. The wife cites Arnold v. Arnold, 967 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007), for the proposition that the fact that life insurance proceeds may not be paid until later does not prevent them from being classified as marital assets. Arnold did not involve life insurance but deferred retirement benefits. Th…
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Cardarelli v. Tracy Cardarelli/forgeron (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)…ng interest and COLAs, even when the DROP account is created after the dissolution became final. See, e.g., Russell v. Russell, 922 So. 2d 1097, 1099 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Swanson v. Swanson, 869 So. 2d 735, 738 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Arnold v. Arnold, 967 So. 2d 392, 393 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); Pullo v. Pullo, 926 So. 2d 448, 451 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). As the First District 3 has explained, “benefits giving rise to rights in a DROP account could ‘accrue[ ] during the marriage,…
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Cardarelli v. Tracy Cardarelli/forgeron (Fla. 4th DCA 2022)…g interest and COLAs, even when the DROP account is created after the dissolution became final. See, e.g., Russell v. Russell, 922 So. 2d 1097, 1099 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006); Swanson v. Swanson, 869 So. 2d 735, 738 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Arnold v. Arnold, 967 So. 2d 392, 393 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); Pullo v. Pullo, 926 So. 2d 448, 451 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). As the First District has explained, “benefits giving rise to rights in a DROP account could ‘accrue[ ] during the marriage,’ within the meaning of the statute, an…
Authorities Cited
- DeLOACH v. Ruthie Mae DeLOACH, 590 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Eldis Raymell Boyett v. Boyett, 703 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 1997)
- Yarbrough v. State, 926 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)
- Swanson v. Swanson, 869 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)
- Ganzel v. Ganzel, 770 So. 2d 304 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
- Russell v. Russell, 922 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)
- NIX v. NIX, 930 So. 2d 711 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006)
- NIX v. NIX, 959 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 2007)