WILLIE BOONE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Willie Boone appeals from a probation revocation and 30-year sentence imposed after he committed new crimes while on probation. The court affirmed the probation revocation based on sufficient evidence but reversed the sentence as exceeding the legal maximum under the "true split sentence" doctrine, which prohibits re-sentencing beyond the original suspended portion upon revocation.
The probation revocation was valid because certified copies of judgments provide sufficient evidentiary basis to support the finding of probation violation. However, the 30-year sentence exceeded the legal maximum and violated the double jeopardy clause because when a true split sentence is imposed, the court cannot later sentence a defendant to a period exceeding the original suspended portion upon probation revocation.
[1] Certified copies of judgments of conviction bearing the clerk of court's seal are sufficient evidentiary basis to support a finding that a defendant committed subsequent…
[2] A trial court's reliance on certified copies of judgments of conviction to prove a probation violation does not violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment confrontation clause…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“when a sentencing court imposes a true split sentence, the judge has effectively sentenced the defendant in advance for a probation violation and is not later permitted to change his or her mind. Upon revocation of probation, the court may not order the defendant incarcerated for a period exceeding the suspended portion because to do so would be a violation of the double jeopardy clause.”
Establishes the controlling legal principle that limits sentencing authority upon probation revocation following a true split sentence
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBoone was originally charged with attempted first-degree murder but pleaded to aggravated battery as a habitual violent felony offender in 2000, recei…
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LAWSON, J.
Willie James Boone appeals from an order revoking his probation and sentencing him to thirty years in prison. He challenges both the basis for the revocation and the sentence imposed. We find no merit in Boone’s challenge to the finding that he violated his probation by committing new crimes. However, we agree with Boone that the trial judge imposed a sentence longer than allowed by law. Therefore, we reverse the sentence and remand for resentencing.
Boone was originally charged with attempted first degree murder. In 2000, he entered a plea bargain with the State pursuant to which he pled to a single count of aggravated battery, as a habitual violent felony offender, (“HVFO”), in exchange for a prison sentence of ten years, with four and a half years suspended. The State also waived Boone’s prison releasee reof-fender status, a firearm minimum mandatory, and the minimum mandatory sentence set forth in the HVFO statute. The imposed sentence was a “true split sentence,” providing that after Boone served five and a half years the balance of his ten-year sentence would be suspended and Boone would be placed on probation for the remaining four and a half years.
Boone was released to probation after five and a half years, and violated his probation by breaking into a home and sexually battering the occupant. At Boone’s violation of probation proceeding in this case, the State relied solely on certified copies of judgments of conviction on charges of burglary of a dwelling (with an assault) and sexual battery, which bear the seal of the clerk of court from Jefferson County, Florida.1 Contrary to Boone’s argument, the certified judgments provide a sufficient evidentiary basis to support the trial courts’ finding that Boone committed these subsequent crimes while on probation.2 E.g., Stevens v. State, 397 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), approved 409 So. 2d 1051 (Fla.1982); see also, Tompkins v. State, 502 So. 2d 415, 420 (Fla.1986) (recognizing certified copies of judgment and sentence are sufficient to support a jury finding, at penalty phase of capital case, of aggravating circumstance that defendant committed prior felony involving use of threat or violence). The trial judge then revoked Boone’s probation and sentenced him to thirty years in prison as a habitual violent felony offender. Because Boone was initially given a “true split sentence,” he could not be sentenced upon revocation of his probation to a period that exceeded the original ten- year sentence, with credit for time served. Mack v. State, 823 So. 2d 746 (Fla.2002). As explained in Mack:
[W]hen a sentencing court imposes a true split sentence, the judge has effectively sentenced the defendant in advance for a probation violation and is not later permitted to change his or her mind. Upon revocation of probation, the court may not order the defendant incarcerated for a period exceeding the suspended portion because to do so would be a violation of the double jeopardy clause.
Id. at 748 n. 3 (citing Poore v. State, 531 So. 2d 161, 164 (Fla.1988)).
Therefore, we affirm the revocation of Boone’s probation, reverse the sentence, and remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion. Because Boone was originally designated as a habitual violent felony offender, this designation is also appropriate upon resentencing.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED.
PALMER, C.J., and PLEUS, J, concur. . Boone is serving concurrent sentences of life and thirty years on the Jefferson County charges.
. On appeal, Boone also argues that the trial court’s reliance on the certified judgments violated his rights under the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment, citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). Because trial counsel did not make this objection below, however, we find that the issue was not preserved for appellate review. E.g., Castor v. State, 365 So. 2d 701, 703 (Fla.1978).
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Bracero v. State, 14 So. 3d 1058 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)…a defendant violates probation after being sentenced to a true split sentence, the judge may not order new incarceration exceeding the remaining balance of the withheld or suspended portion of the original sentence.” Id. at 772. In Boone v. State, 967 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007), the defendant entered into a plea bargain and was originally sentenced in 2000. The Fifth District stated, “Because Boone was initially given a ‘true split sentence,’ he could not be sentenced upon revocation of his probation to…
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N'Jai Obantu v. State, 50 So. 3d 107 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010)…n. 1 (Fla.2000)). Obantu’s original sentences were true split sentences. Therefore, the trial court erred by sentencing him in the two VOP eases to a term exceeding the remaining balance of the suspended portion of his sentences. See Boone v. State, 967 So. 2d 999, 1001 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (“ ‘[W]hen a sentencing court imposes a true split sentence, the judge has effectively sentenced the defendant in advance for a probation violation and is not later permitted to change his or her mind. Upon revocation of pr…
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Jotonnia Hayes v. State, 69 So. 3d 1035 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011)…en a defendant’s probation is revoked while she is serving a true split sentence, the trial court may not impose a sentence that exceeds the remaining balance of the suspended sentence. Poore v. State, 581 So. 2d 161, 164 (Fla.1988); Boone v. State, 967 So. 2d 999, 1000-01 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). However, a review of the plea colloquy and sentencing hearing supports the trial court’s ruling that Hayes was not given a true split sentence. The trial court accepted the defense’s proposed resolution of the case. Bas…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (U.S. 2004)
- Castor v. State, 365 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1978)
- Poore v. State, 531 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1988)
- Tompkins v. State, 502 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1986)
- Mack v. State, 823 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 2002)
- Udell Shirley Stevens, Jr. v. State, 409 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1982)
- Udell Shirley Stevens, Jr. v. State, 397 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)