DAVID CARLTON DEY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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David Dey appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence from a traffic stop based on a cracked windshield. The trial court relied on precedent permitting such stops, but the Florida Supreme Court subsequently overruled that precedent, requiring that windshield cracks justify a stop only if they render the vehicle unsafe. The appellate court reverses and remands for reconsideration under the new legal standard.
A stop for a cracked windshield is permissible only where an officer reasonably believes the crack renders the vehicle in such unsafe condition as to endanger any person or property. The trial court's denial of the motion to suppress, based on the now-overruled Hilton II standard, must be reconsidered under the new Hilton III standard.
[1] A traffic stop for a cracked windshield is permissible only if an officer reasonably believes the crack renders the vehicle unsafe and endangers persons or property.
[2] The decisional law in effect at the time an appeal is decided governs the issues raised on appeal, even if the law has changed since the time of trial.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“an officer may stop a vehicle with a visibly cracked windshield regardless of whether the crack creates any immediate hazard”
The discredited Hilton II standard that the trial court had relied upon
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDey was stopped by police for having a cracked windshield on his vehicle. Drugs were found during the stop. The trial court denied Dey's motion to sup…
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FULMER, Judge.
David Dey appeals from a final order of probation that was entered after he pleaded no contest to possession of cocaine and reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. In this motion, Dey challenged the validity of his traffic stop. Dey was stopped by police because the windshield of the vehicle he was driving was cracked, according to the officer who testified at the suppression hearing. Drugs were found in the vehicle. The trial court denied Dejfs motion to suppress, relying on Hilton v. State, 901 So. 2d 155; 157 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (en banc) (designated as Hilton II by the supreme court), in which this court held that “an officer may stop a vehicle with a visibly cracked windshield regardless of whether the crack creates any immediate hazard.”
Subsequent to the hearing, however, the Florida Supreme Court in Hilton v. State, 961 So. 2d 284 (Fla.2007) (Hilton III), quashed this court’s decision in Hilton II, concluding that the provision of section 316.610 which authorizes vehicle stops for equipment that is ‘not in proper adjustment or repair,’ § 316.610(1), Fla. Stat. (2001), does not encompass windshield cracks. Thus, a stop for a cracked windshield is permissible only where an officer reasonably believes that the crack renders the vehicle ‘in such unsafe condition as to endanger any person or property.’ § 316.610, Fla. Stat. (2001).
961 So. 2d at 292. Because the law that governs the validity of the stop has changed, we reverse and remand for the trial court to reconsider Dey’s motion to suppress and, if necessary, to conduct a new evidentiary hearing. See Wheeler v. State, 344 So. 2d 244, 245 (Fla.1977) (“The decisional law in effect at the time an appeal is decided governs the issues raised on appeal, even where there has been a change of law since the time of trial.”).
Reversed and remanded, with instructions.
CASANUEYA and KELLY, JJ., Concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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Murphy v. State, 32 So. 3d 122 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009)…sues addressed in the intervening Supreme Court decision in Gant, we are unable to determine whether the search of the vehicle was proper in this case. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new hearing on the motion to suppress. See Dey v. State, 967 So. 2d 1070, 1071 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (reversing and remanding for reconsideration of motion to suppress based on change in law regarding the validity of the traffic stop). On remand, the court shall consider the issue of Murphy’s standing to challenge the searc…
Authorities Cited
- Wheeler v. State, 344 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1977)
- Tristan Hilton v. State, 961 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 2007)
- Tristan Hilton v. State, 901 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)