CARL LEE HICKS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed Carl Lee Hicks's cocaine delivery conviction because the trial court erroneously admitted expert testimony from officers that drug transactions commonly involve two people—one to broker the deal and another to deliver the drugs. This testimony improperly bolstered the prosecution's case against a defendant from whom neither money nor drugs were recovered.
The court held that the trial court erred in admitting the officers' testimony about common drug transaction practices, as such testimony constitutes inadmissible character or practice evidence that cannot be used as substantive proof of guilt or innocence. The error was not harmless because the testimony was used to refute the defense theory that appellant was innocent given the absence of contraband or marked money on his person.
[1] Testimony from law enforcement officers regarding their experience with other criminals is not admissible as substantive proof of a defendant's guilt or innocence.
[2] Allowing officers to testify about generalized common practices of drug dealers is inadmissible as proof of a defendant's guilt.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“testimony from officers regarding their experience with other criminals is not admissible as substantive proof of guilt or innocence”
Establishes the core legal principle that officer experience testimony about criminal practices cannot be used to prove a defendant's guilt.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAn undercover officer posing as a drug buyer asked appellant Hicks for crack cocaine. Hicks said he did not have it but knew someone who did. Shortly …
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We reverse appellant’s conviction for cocaine delivery for a new trial because the court erred in allowing officers to testify that in their experience, drug transactions often included two people involved in the sale, one who makes the offer, and the other who delivers the drugs.
An officer posing as a drug buyer told a man in a targeted area that she wanted a “40,” slang for forty dollars worth of crack cocaine. This man, who was identified as the appellant, responded that he didn’t have it, but he knew someone who did. Shortly after that, another man handed her two crack rocks in exchange for forty dollars, and appellant was then arrested. Neither the money, which was marked, nor any drugs, were found in appellant’s possession.
During the trial, over objection, the court allowed an officer to testify as follows:
Q. “In your experience as an undercover officer ... have there ever been times when you dealt with more than one person where you stopped to buy the drugs and you were talking to somebody about 40 and hard and all these other things, have there ever been times where there was more than one person involved in that transaction?”
A. “Yes.” ... “there [was] either a situation where I handed one person money but the other person handed me the drugs, or a situation where I arranged for the deal with one person and that person went to get another person who then I did the transaction with.”
Another officer was allowed to testify over objection that he had encountered situations in which the first person “brokers” the deal because he has the street smarts to evaluate the prospective purchaser. The broker then summons another person to make the transaction. In Lowder v. State, 589 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), an officer was allowed to testify based on his expertise that there was a correlation between carrying large amounts of cash and selling illegal drugs. The third district reversed the defendant’s conviction based on the cases holding that testimony from officers regarding their experience with other criminals is not admissible as substantive proof of guilt or innocence. This court follows that rule. Griffin v. State, 872 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (officer cannot testify that it is common for people involved with crack cocaine to hide it in their mouths); Lawrence v. State, 766 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (generalized common practices of drug dealers inadmissible as proof of defendant’s guilt).
We are unable to agree with the state that this error was harmless because the testimony was used to refute the defense theory that appellant was innocent since neither the marked money nor any drugs were found on him.
Reversed for a new trial.
POLEN and MAY, JJ., concur.
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Citator
Cited By
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White v. State, 971 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)…le to keep crack cocaine in their mouth,” Griffin v. State, 872 So. 2d 998, 999 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); —“drug transactions often included two people involved in the sale, one who makes the offer, and the other who delivers the drugs,” Hicks v. State, 967 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). Detective Oliver’s testimony in this case is similar to that held inadmissible in Hicks, Hamilton, White, and Thomas. We do not find that “there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.” Goodwi…
Authorities Cited
- Lowder v. State, 589 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991)
- Lawrence v. State, 766 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)
- Griffin v. State, 872 So. 2d 998 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)