ROSE J. SPANO, APPELLANT,
v.
LORRAINE HOFFMAN, MELISSA MARA, AND KENNETH MARVIN, APPELLEES
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Rose Spano appealed the dismissal of her defamation and tortious interference complaint against three defendants. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed dismissal against two Florida Bar employees based on absolute immunity, but reversed dismissal against defendant Melissa Mara because she was not alleged to be a Bar employee or government official.
Absolute immunity extends to Florida Bar employees (Hoffman and Marvin) for statements made in connection with official duties in Bar disciplinary proceedings, regardless of malice. However, absolute immunity does not apply to Melissa Mara because the complaint did not allege she was a Bar employee or government official.
[1] Employees of The Florida Bar acting within the scope of their official duties during disciplinary proceedings are protected by an absolute privilege from liability for de…
[2] An absolute privilege for statements made by government officials acting within the scope of their duties attaches regardless of whether the statements were made intentio…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The Florida Bar and its agents acting within the scope of their office are protected from liability for publication of defamatory matter by an absolute privilege”
Establishes the basis for absolute immunity for Bar employees acting in their official capacity
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePlaintiff Rose Spano brought a fourth amended complaint for defamation and tortious interference with business relationships against Lorraine Hoffman,…
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PER CURIAM.
The plaintiff appeals the dismissal with prejudice of her fourth amended complaint for defamation and tortuous interference with business relationships. The dismissal was based on the trial court’s determination that the alleged statements were absolutely privileged because they were made by Florida Bar employees in connection with their official duties during the course of Bar disciplinary proceedings. We affirm the dismissal as to defendants Lorraine Hoffman and Kenneth Marvin because the complaint alleged that these two defendants were employees of The Florida Bar: See Hauser v. Urchisin, 231 So. 2d 6, 8 (Fla.1970) (extending absolute immunity to officials of all branches of government); R. Regulating Fla. Bar, Introduction (2006) (stating that the Florida Bar is an “official arm” of the Florida Supreme Court); Mueller v. The Florida Bar, 390 So. 2d 449, 452-53 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980) (stating that The Florida Bar and its agents acting within the scope of their office are protected from liability for publication of defamatory matter by an absolute privilege).
We reverse the dismissal with prejudice, however, as to the defendant Melissa Mara because the fourth amended complaint does not allege that she was employed by the Florida Bar or that she had any relationship to the Florida Bar or any other governmental agency. Thus, the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint against Melissa Mara on absolute immunity grounds. See Royal & Sunalliance v. Lauderdale Marine Ctr., 877 So. 2d 843, 845 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)(stating that in reviewing a motion to dismiss the trial court is limited to the four corners of the complaint).
We reject the plaintiffs argument that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint against Hoffman and Marvin on grounds of absolute privilege because the complaint alleged that the defamatory statements were made intentionally and maliciously. An absolute privilege attaches regardless of whether such statements were made with malice, so long as the employees were acting within the scope of their duties. See Mueller, 390 So. 2d at 452; Tucker v. Resha, 634 So. 2d 756, 758-59 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
Affirmed in part, Reversed in part.
SHAH'OOD, C.J., FARMER and TAYLOR, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Hauser v. Urchisin, 231 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1970)
- Mueller v. THE Florida BAR, 390 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980)
- Royal & Sunalliance v. Lauderdale Marine Ctr., 877 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)
- Tucker v. Resha, 634 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)