DANIEL CLIATT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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A trial court, when not exercising its discretion to impose life imprisonment, cannot impose a sentence where the combined incarceration and probationary term exceeds the statutory maximum for the offense.
The defendant was adjudicated guilty of multiple felonies, resulting in a high Criminal Punishment Code score. The trial court sentenced the defendant…
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PER CURIAM.
Cliatt was adjudicated guilty of five first degree felonies, seven second degree felonies, and one third degree felony. The felonies occurred between October 1, 2004 and April 23, 2005. His Criminal Punishment Code scoresheet of 880.1 total sentence points created a lowest permissible prison sentence of 53.25 years. Pursuant to section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes (2004), the trial court was authorized to sentence Cliatt to life imprisonment:
The lowest permissible sentence is the minimum sentence that may be imposed by the trial court absent a valid reason for departure.... If the total sentence points are greater than or equal to 363, the court may sentence the offender to life imprisonment....
Instead, the trial court sentenced Cliatt to a composite sentence of seventy years imprisonment followed by life probation. This composite sentence was achieved by Cliatt being sentenced to thirty years on each of the first degree felonies and either ten or fifteen years on the second degree felonies with some of the sentences running consecutive and some of the sentences running concurrent. Except as to the third degree felony, life probation was imposed on each count.
Because the trial court did not exercise its discretion to impose life imprisonment, it could not impose a sentence in which the total of the incareerative term and the probationary term exceeded the maximum sentence for a particular offense. Carter v. State, 920 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).
On remand, the trial court may restructure its sentence to try to achieve its original sentencing goal; provided, that absent an intervening event which would justify a greater sentence, the new sentence shall not be a more severe sentence than the sentence originally imposed. Blackshear v. State, 531 So. 2d 956 (Fla.1988).
REVERSED and REMANDED for Re-sentencing.
PLEUS, MONACO and EVANDER, JJ., concur.
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Rigueiro v. State, 132 So. 3d 853 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)…r, the trial court actually sentenced Rigueiro to forty-year concurrent prison terms, followed by five years of sex offender probation. This was an illegal sentence, as the State has conceded in its response filed in this court. See Cliatt v. State, 970 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). We recognize, as the court did in Cliatt, that on remand the court may restructure its sentence to accomplish its intended goals at the original sentencing, so long as the new sentence is not deemed to be more [*855] severe than…
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Renaldo Champagne v. State (Fla. 2d DCA 2019)
Authorities Cited
- Blackshear v. State, 531 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 1988)
- Carter v. State, 920 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)