JABRI, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
U SAVE MOTORS, INC., ETC., APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
A voluntary dismissal divests the trial court of jurisdiction to enter any subsequent orders, including an order directing the return of funds previously paid.
Jabri obtained a default judgment against U Save, which paid the judgment to avoid execution. U Save later had the judgment set aside. After Jabri fil…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Worthless Checks cases and more on FLexlaw
GERSTEN, C.J.
Jabri, Inc. (“Jabri”) appeals an order granting U Save Motors, Inc.’s (“U Save”) motion for return of funds. Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order, we reverse.
Jabri sued U Save to recover on worthless checks and obtained a summary default judgment. To avoid execution on the judgment, U Save paid Jabri $16,266. Subsequently, U Save had the judgment set aside. Soon after the judgment was set aside, Jabri filed a notice of voluntary dismissal. After Jabri’s voluntary dismissal, the trial court entered an order directing Jabri to return the $16,266.
Jabri asserts that the trial court erred in entering the order because its voluntary dismissal divested the trial court of jurisdiction. U Save contends the trial court had the inherent power to order the return of the money even after the voluntary dismissal. We agree with Jabri.
The voluntary dismissal divested the trial court of the power to enter any subsequent orders. See Randle-Eastern Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Vasta, 360 So. 2d 68 (Fla.1978). As the Court stated in Vas-ta:
The right to dismiss one’s own lawsuit during the course of a trial is guaranteed by Rule 1.420(a), endowing a plaintiff with unilateral authority to block action favorable to a defendant which the trial judge might be disposed to approve. The effect is to remove completely from the court’s consideration the power to enter an order, equivalent in all respects to a deprivation of “jurisdiction.”
360 So. 2d at 69.
Accordingly, because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order directing the return of funds, we reverse.
Reversed and remanded.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Almazan v. In re Est. of Alberto Aguilera-Valdez, 273 So. 3d 9 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019)…ary dismissal. Although we have found no cases directly addressing this type of situation, we find persuasive other cases that have limited a court’s inherent authority after a voluntary dismissal. See, e.g., Jabri, Inc. v. U Save Motors, Inc., 971 So. 2d 912, 912–13 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (holding that the voluntary dismissal divested the trial court of the power to enter an order for the return of funds); Romar Int’l, Inc. v. Jim Rathman Chevrolet/Cadillac, Inc., 420 So. 2d 346, 348 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)…
Authorities Cited
- Randle-Eastern Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Vasta, 360 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1978)