B.W., A JUVENILE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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The adjudication of guilt for trespass in a structure cannot stand because the area in question (a stairway) was neither a 'structure' nor its 'curtilage'.
A juvenile was charged with trespass after warning and trespass in a structure after failing to leave a stairway leading to the entrance of a health c…
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SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.
The juvenile-appellant was charged with trespass after warning (count 1) and trespass in a structure (count 2) as a result of her repeated failure to leave an open, unfenced stairway leading from the walkway to the front porch and entrance doors of the Unity Health and Rehabilitation Center in Miami-Dade County. She was found not guilty as to count 1, but guilty as to count 2 and appeals.
As the state rightly concedes, the adjudication cannot stand because the stairway, which was plainly not within the “structure” itself, was also, contrary to the trial court’s belief, not within its “curtilage,” so as to justify such a conviction. See Freeman v. State, 743 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); L.K.B. v. State, 677 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996).
The state bravely suggests that B.W. was actually guilty of “trespass on property other than a structure or conveyance after warning.” This claim however, is entirely unavailing. Rightly or (probably) wrongly, B.W. was acquitted of count 1, the only charge which alleges that conduct. Obviously, we have no authority to interfere with that determination in any way. See L.F. v. State, 859 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003).
Accordingly, the adjudication is reversed with directions to discharge the respondent.
Reversed and remanded.
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Citator
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C.P. v. State, 99 So. 3d 522 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011)…tructure is a necessary element. See Keys v. State, 949 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). Although a structure may include curtilage, the curtilage area must be enclosed in some manner. See State v. Hamilton, 660 So. 2d 1038 (Fla.1995); B.W. v. State, 973 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). Here, C.P. never entered the mobile home. There is no evidence that the area around the mobile home was enclosed. Therefore, the State failed to prove trespass; however, there was sufficient evidence to uphold a charge for attem…
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Ruiz v. State, 23 So. 3d 208 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)…extended Hamilton to the trespass statute. Id. at 926 (holding that because both burglary and trespass rely on the definition of “structure” found in section 810.011(1), there is no basis to limit Hamilton to burglary cases); see also B.W. v. State, 973 So. 2d 657, 658 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); Freeman v. State, 743 So. 2d 603, 603 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999). In the instant case, it is undisputed that neither party contended the parking lot was enclosed. Therefore, we reverse Ruiz’s judgment of conviction for trespass in…
Authorities Cited
- L.K.B. v. State, 677 So. 2d 925 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)
- Freeman v. State, 743 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
- Ferenc v. Fla. Dep't OF Corr., 859 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003)