DANIEL Y. HIRSCH, APPELLANT,
v.
RAQUEL RADHA HIRSCH, APPELLEE
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In this family law appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court's order imputing $7,000 per month in rental income to a husband based on his rent-free use of a home, finding that such imputation was improper because the parties no longer had use of the home at the time of the dissolution petition. The court affirmed the temporary attorney's fee award and remanded for recalculation of temporary alimony and child support.
The court held that the magistrate erred in imputing $7,000 per month fair rental value to the husband because the rent-free use of the home had ended and no longer constituted an in-kind payment reducing his living expenses. The order was affirmed in part and reversed in part, with remand for recalculation of temporary alimony and child support.
[1] Income may not be imputed for the rent-free use of a home if the parties no longer possess the use of the home at the time of the dissolution petition and hearing.
[2] Reimbursed expenses or in-kind payments that reduce living expenses are included in gross income for child support calculations.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“[r]eimbursed expenses or in kind payments to the extent that they reduce living expenses”
Definition of gross income under the child support statute that the court applied to the imputation of income analysis
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe husband and wife had rent-free use of a home owned by the husband's mother's corporation for three years. The parties vacated the home in early 20…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal of a trial court order approving the recommendation of the general magistrate which set temporary alimony, child support, and attorney’s fees in the parties’ pending suit for dissolution of marriage. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
The husband argues, and we agree, that the magistrate should not have imputed income of $7,000 per month to the husband for the rent-free use of the home in which the parties previously resided. According to the testimony, the parties had the use of this home, which was owned by the husband’s mother’s corporation, for three years. However, the parties vacated the home in early 2005 because the property was to be sold. The instant petition for dissolution of marriage was not filed until November 15, 2005. Thus at the time of the petition and the time of the hearing before the general magistrate, the parties no longer had the use of the rent-free home.
As stated in the child support statute, gross income includes “[r]eimbursed expenses or in kind payments to the extent that they reduce living expenses.” § 61.30(2)(a)13., Fla. Stat. (2006). While by its terms section 61.30 applies only to child support, the logic is equally applicable to the imputation of income for purposes of temporary alimony. See id. § 61.08(2)(g) (“[T]he court shall consider all relevant economic factors, including but not limited to ... (g) All sources of income available to either party.”). Because the rent-free use of the home had ended, it no longer amounted to an in kind payment which reduced the husband’s living expenses. That being so, the magistrate should not have imputed to the husband $7,000 per month fair rental value. We must therefore reverse the order now before us and remand for reconsideration of the temporary alimony and child support awards after elimination of the imputed $7,000 per month amount.
We affirm with respect to the remaining issues. See Fisher v. Bond, 906 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005). We do not disturb the temporary attorney’s fee award.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent herewith.