WILLIAM HEAD, APPELLANT,
v.
WALTER A. MCNEIL, SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, APPELLEE
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William Head sought a writ of mandamus to challenge the Department of Corrections' denial of gain time credit toward his release date. The circuit court dismissed his petition as untimely under the 30-day rule for prison disciplinary proceedings, but the appellate court reversed, holding that the one-year limitations period for non-disciplinary prisoner petitions applied instead.
The petition was not time-barred because section 95.11(5)(f)'s one-year limitations period, not section 95.11(8)'s 30-day period, governed Head's petition. Section 95.11(8) applies only to appeals of prison disciplinary proceedings, while Head's petition challenged an administrative determination regarding gain time and did not involve a disciplinary proceeding or conviction challenge.
[1] A petition for writ of mandamus filed by a prisoner challenging an administrative determination regarding gain time, and not a prison disciplinary proceeding or convictio…
[2] The thirty-day statute of limitations under section 95.11(8), Florida Statutes, applies only to appeals of prison disciplinary proceedings.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Section 95.11(8) requires a party appealing a prison disciplinary proceeding to file a petition within thirty days of the Office of the Secretary of the DOC's final decision. In contrast, section 95.11(5)(f) provides that '[e]xcept for actions [challenging prison disciplinary proceedings], a petition for extraordinary writ, other than a petition challenging a criminal conviction, filed by or on behalf of a prisoner' must be brought within one year of exhausting administrative remedies.”
Establishes the distinction between the two applicable statutes and their respective time periods
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHead filed a grievance with the DOC on July 10, 2006, requesting application of gain time to his release date. After exhausting administrative remedie…
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PER CURIAM.
William Head, Appellant, seeks review of a circuit court order dismissing his petition for writ of mandamus as untimely under section 95.11(8), Florida Statutes (2006). Appellant argues that the circuit court erred in applying section 95.11(8) instead of 95.11(5)(f), Florida Statutes (2006), when it dismissed his petition. The State concedes that the circuit court applied the incorrect statutory provision. We agree and reverse the circuit court’s order dismissing Appellant’s petition for writ of mandamus because the circuit court erred in finding that Appellant’s claim was time-barred.
On July 10, 2006, Appellant filed a grievance with the Department of Corrections (DOC) requesting application of his gain time to his release date. Following Appellant’s exhaustion of his administrative remedies, the Office of the Secretary of the DOC entered its final denial of Appellant’s grievance appeal on September 19, 2006. Appellant filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the circuit court on November 1, 2006, raising the same arguments he asserted in his original grievance.1 The circuit court denied Appellant’s petition as untimely under section 95.11(8) on January 16, 2007.
Section 95.11(8) requires a party appealing a prison disciplinary proceeding to file a petition within thirty days of the Office of the Secretary of the DOC’s final decision. In contrast, section 95.11(5)(f) provides that “[efccept for actions [challenging prison disciplinary proceedings], a petition for extraordinary writ, other than a petition challenging a criminal conviction, filed by or on behalf of a prisoner” must be brought within one year of exhausting administrative remedies. See also Canete v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 967 So. 2d 412, 414 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (holding that an inmate’s claim for mandamus relief regarding restoration of jail credit was not time-barred under section 95.11(5)(f) when he exhausted all administrative remedies and invoked the trial court’s jurisdiction well within one year of that date).
Appellant sought review of an administrative determination that denied application of gain time to his date of release in his petition for writ of mandamus. Appellant did not argue against a disciplinary proceeding or his conviction. Therefore, the thirty-day time period set forth in section 95.11(8) is inapplicable, and section 95.11(5)(f), which sets forth a one-year time period, is the provision governing Appellant’s petition. Appellant’s petition was filed well within the time period set forth in section 95.11(5)(f) and should have been considered timely filed.
Accordingly, the order of the circuit court dismissing Appellant’s petition for writ of mandamus as untimely is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
PADOVANO, LEWIS, and THOMAS, JJ., concur. . Pro se prisoners’ petitions are deemed filed on the date they are delivered to prison officials. Haag v. State, 591 So. 2d 614, 617 (Fla.1992).
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Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Thurston McCLAIN, 591 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 1992)
- Haag v. State, 591 So. 2d 614 (Fla. 1992)
- Canete v. Fla. Dep't OF Corr., 967 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007)