MIGUEL LAGO, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 2008-03-05
No. 3D06-1336
Before GERSTEN, C.J., and GREEN and RAMIREZ, JJ.
975 So. 2d 613 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (2008) Positive Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Miguel Lago appealed the denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing his consecutive sentences for robbery and firearm possession violated double jeopardy protections. The court granted his petition for habeas corpus and ordered resentencing, finding that despite the law of the case doctrine, manifest injustice required correcting the patently illegal sentences.


Holding

The court held that it has the power and responsibility to correct a patently illegal sentence that violates the double jeopardy clause and constitutes manifest injustice, even where the law of the case doctrine would normally preclude reconsideration. The consecutive sentence for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony was violative of double jeopardy and therefore the sentence was manifestly unjust.


Headnotes

[1] A consecutive sentence for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, when arising from the same incident as a conviction for robbery with a firearm, viol…

[2] A trial court may deny a motion to correct an illegal sentence on the grounds of the law of the case doctrine.

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Key Quotes

“The defendant, through counsel, has made a compelling case that his sentence is patently illegal.... Additionally, it is plain from the face of the record that the defendant received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in his direct appeal”

Trial court's acknowledgment that the sentence was patently illegal and there was ineffective assistance of appellate counsel

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Facts & Procedural History

Lago was convicted in 1990 of robbery with a firearm and unlawful possession of a firearm while engaged in a criminal offense, both arising from the s…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

On Motion for Rehearing

PER CURIAM.

We grant the motion for rehearing, withdraw our prior opinion filed September 5, 2007, and substitute the following in its stead. The appellant, Miguel Lago, appeals from the denial of his Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800 motion to correct illegal sentence. We treat this appeal as a petition for common law habeas corpus and grant the same.

Lago was convicted and sentenced in 1990 to consecutive sentences for robbery with a firearm and unlawful possession of a firearm while engaged in a criminal offense. Both convictions arose out of the same robbery of the same victim. After an unsuccessful direct appeal and several unsuccessful pro se post-conviction challenges to his convictions and sentences, Lago filed a Rule 3.800 motion to correct illegal sentence in November 2005 on the grounds that his consecutive sentences were violative of his constitutional protection against double jeopardy. For the first time since his direct appeal, counsel appeared on behalf of Lago and argued the motion to the trial court. Although raised by Lago in his prior pro se post-conviction motions, this was the first time that Lago had counsel to assist him in raising his double jeopardy claim. The State opposed Lago’s motion on the grounds of “law of the case.” Although the trial court found Lago’s sentence to be “patently illegal,” it denied the motion, on law of the case grounds. Specifically, the trial court found that:

The defendant, through counsel, has made a compelling case that his sentence is patently illegal.... Additionally, it is plain from the face of the record that the defendant received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in his direct appeal and that, ... he would have had his sentence on Count II [possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony] vacated had any of his prior filings been deemed to have raised an ineffective assistance claim.

Nonetheless, the Court is constrained to deny relief in this case, even though it works, and this Court expressly finds, a manifest injustice in this case.

Because we agree that Lago’s sentence for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony is violative of the double jeopardy clause, and thus “patently illegal,” we find that his consecutive sentence for the same to be manifestly unjust. We also agree that the trial court’s denial of Lago’s Rule 3.800 motion was proper on law of the case grounds. This, however, does not preclude us from correcting Lago’s sentencing error. See Strazzulla v. Hendrick, 177 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla.1965)(recognizing appellate court’s power to reconsider and correct ruling that has become “law of the case” where adherence to ruling would result in manifest injustice). Where, as here, a manifest injustice has occurred it is the responsibility of the court to correct that injustice, if it can. See Adams v. State, 957 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007).

Accordingly, we treat Lago’s appeal as a petition for writ of habeas corpus and grant the same. See Ross v. State, 901 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)(habeas corpus relief granted, despite law of the case doctrine, where manifest injustice had occurred). We therefore remand this case with instructions that Lago be resentenced in accordance with this opinion.

Petition granted.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Furney v. State, 115 So. 3d 1095 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)
    …est injustice and ordered supplemental briefing on the issue of whether Furney should be granted a belated appeal. See Carswell v. State, 23 So. 3d 195, 197 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009); Johnson v. State, 9 So. 3d 640, 640 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009); Lago v. State, 975 So. 2d 613, 614 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008). Having considered the parties’ supplemental briefs and the entire trial transcript, we grant Furney a new trial. In 2003, the State charged Furney with aggravated battery and two counts of aggravated assault with a firearm.…
  • Perez v. State, 118 So. 3d 298 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013)
    …also Miller v. State, 814 So. 2d 1131, 1132 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002). The defendant has the burden of demonstrating a manifest injustice through clear proof of prejudice. Williams v. State, 316 So. 2d 267, 274 (Fla.1975). As recognized in Lago v. State, 975 So. 2d 613, 614 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2008), where “a manifest injustice has occurred it is the responsibility of the court to correct that injustice, if it can.” As acknowledged in Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1089 (Fla.2008), “the standard in Florida for a ne…
  • Carswell v. State, 23 So. 3d 195 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)
    …post-conviction relief, filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. To prevent manifest injustice, we treat this appeal as a petition for writ of habeas corpus and grant a belated direct appeal on a limited issue. See Lago v. State, 975 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (treating appeal as petition for habeas corpus and granting relief in order to correct a manifest injustice).1 The State charged the defendant with attempted second degree murder with a firearm for a fight that resulted in a shoo…

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