JAMES R. MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY, ETC., APPELLANT,
v.
CARL DURRAH, APPELLEE
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The Florida Department of Corrections appealed a trial court's grant of habeas relief requiring it to credit a defendant's prior prison time toward his remaining incarceration after violation of a suspended sentence. The appellate court reversed, holding that a defendant is not entitled to prison credit for prior incarceration when the suspended portion of a true split sentence is reinstated following a probation violation.
A defendant is not entitled to prison credit for prior incarceration when the suspended portion of a true split sentence is reinstated following a violation of probation. The sentencing order's language regarding prison credit was ambiguous, and the Department of Corrections correctly interpreted it consistently with settled Florida law in denying the credit.
[1] A defendant is not entitled to prison credit toward remaining incarceration for a prior period of incarceration after the suspended portion of a true split sentence is un…
[2] Ambiguous language in a sentencing order regarding prison credit is subject to interpretation by the Department of Corrections consistent with settled law.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“on 'unsuspending' the suspended portion of the defendant's true split sentences following his violation of probation, the defendant was not entitled to prison credit toward his remaining incarceration for the prior period of prison incarceration”
Establishes the core holding that prior prison time cannot be credited when a suspended sentence is reinstated due to probation violation
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDurrah received a true split sentence with both incarcerated and suspended portions. He violated the conditions of his suspension and was returned to …
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PLEUS, J.
The Department of Corrections (“DOC”) appeals from an amended order denying in part and granting in part the defendant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. The broad issue concerns whether the trial court erred in concluding that DOC was required to grant prison credit time to the defendant after he violated the suspended portion of his true split sentence and was returned to jail.
The trial court ruled that the sentencing order granted such credit, albeit in contravention of Florida law, and that DOC could not, consistent with the principle of separation of powers, decline to calculate such credit in setting the defendant’s release date.
We reverse that portion of the amended order which granted in part the defendant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus upon the following holding: (1) on “unsuspending” the suspended portion of the defendant’s true split sentences following his violation of probation, the defendant was not entitled to prison credit toward his remaining incarceration for the prior period of prison incarceration, Moore v. Stephens, 804 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), Crews v. State, 779 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); (2) the language in the sentencing orders relating to prison credit for “30 months, stipulated,” is ambiguous; and (3) DOC, in setting the defendant’s release date, correctly interpreted the sentencing orders consistent with settled Florida law in concluding that the defendant was not entitled to credit for his previous prison time toward the remainder of the suspended portion of the sentences. See Pressly v. Tadlock, 968 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED FOR ENTRY OF AN ORDER DENYING HABEAS RELIEF. GRIFFIN and THOMPSON, JJ„ concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Crews v. State, 779 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
- Moore v. Stephens, 804 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002)
- Hunter v. State, 779 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)
- Pressly v. Tadlock, 968 So. 2d 1057 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)