TREVOR L. JOHNSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Trevor Johnson appealed the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief challenging a scoresheet miscalculation that he claimed denied him his plea agreement for the lowest permissible prison sentence. The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that the motion should have been considered under Rule 3.850 rather than 3.800(a), and that the plea colloquy supported Johnson's claim that he bargained for the lowest permissible sentence rather than a specific term.
The court reversed and remanded, holding that Johnson's motion should have been treated as a timely Rule 3.850 motion rather than being summarily denied under Rule 3.800(a). The court held that the plea colloquy supported Johnson's claim that the agreement was for the lowest permissible prison sentence, not a specific 65.18-month term, and that such claims are cognizable under Rule 3.850.
[1] A motion seeking correction of a scoresheet miscalculation that allegedly denied a defendant the benefit of a plea agreement for the lowest permissible prison sentence sh…
[2] A plea colloquy may support a claim that a plea agreement was for the lowest permissible prison sentence, even if the plea form specifies a term of years.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the sentence will be a bottom of the guidelines sentence of 65.18 months Florida State Prison and he'll be sentenced as a habitual felony offender”
The defense counsel's statement in the plea colloquy indicating the agreement was for the bottom of the guidelines sentence, supporting Johnson's interpretation of the plea agreement.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJohnson entered into a plea agreement whereby the State agreed to reduce a burglary charge and Johnson would plead guilty to remaining counts. The ple…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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PER CURIAM.
Trevor L. Johnson appeals the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). We reverse and remand because the postconviction court should have considered his motion as if it were filed pursuant to rule 3.850. In his motion, Johnson sought correction of a scoresheet miscalculation, which he claims denied him the benefit of his plea agreement for the lowest permissible prison sentence. The State responded to the motion and conceded the obvious calculation error.1 However, citing Williams v. State, 825 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), the State asserted that the plea agreement was for a specific term of 65.18 months and, therefore, the scoresheet miscalculation did not warrant resentencing because the sentence imposed does not exceed the statutory maximum. The State further asserted that “there is no indication in the plea colloquy that the bottom of the guidelines was the specific offer from the State.”
The trial court considered the plea form and the transcript of the plea hearing and concluded that “defendant entered into a negotiated plea for a term of years, and the record does not clearly demonstrate that the parties to the plea agreement intended that Defendant be sentenced to the lowest permissible prison sentence.”
The plea form recites “FSP 65.18 months,” which is the number of months that Johnson’s counsel stated was the bottom of the guidelines sentence. The excerpt from the plea colloquy that is relevant to this issue reads:
[Defense Counsel]: Judge, we have reached a negotiated plea agreement. THE COURT: All right, what are we going to do?
[Defense Counsel]: [The State] has agreed to amend in case number OS-12655, [the State] has agreed to amend and reduce the burglary of a dwelling to burglary of a structure.
Mr. Johnson will plead guilty as charged to the remaining counts in that information and in case number 03-004874, the sentence will be a bottom of the guidelines sentence of 65.18 months Florida State Prison and he’ll be sentenced as a habitual felony offender and we’ll stipulate to the fact that Mr. Johnson does qualify as a habitual felony offender. He has reviewed the plea form as well as the sentencing guideline scoresheet and I’m passing that forward.
While the plea form specifies a term of “FSP 65.18 months,” the transcript supports Johnson’s claim that the agreement was for the lowest permissible prison sentence, which the original scoresheet reflected was 65.18 months. Thus, we are unable to agree with the trial court that the record refutes Johnson’s claim.
Johnson’s entitlement to be resentenced turns on whether his plea agreement was for a specific term of years as the State asserts and the trial court found, or whether it was for the lowest permissible prison sentence, which the plea colloquy appears to support. Thus, Johnson’s claim is the type of claim cognizable under rule 3.850 which affords the evidentiary hearing required to determine the terms of Johnson’s plea agreement. See Dellofano v. State, 946 So. 2d 127, 129 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (Lawson, J., concurring specially) (observing that because there is no procedure in the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure for a “motion to enforce plea agreement,” the only avenue available to the movant is to file a claim pursuant to rule 3.850). Johnson’s rule 3.800(a) motion was filed within the two-year period applicable to rule 3.850 motions, but it was not sworn. The trial court should have treated his motion as a timely filed, facially sufficient rule 3.850 motion and dismissed the mo tion, giving leave to reme the motion under oath within thirty days. See Spera v. State, 971 So. 2d 754 (Fla.2007).
We therefore reverse and remand for reconsideration under rule 3.850. Because the plea agreement and the transcript of the plea colloquy preclude a summary denial of Johnson’s claim, we anticipate that Johnson will be entitled to an evidentiary hearing if he refiles a properly sworn motion.
FULMER, WHATLEY, and CANADY, JJ., Concur. . The lowest permissible prison sentence reflected on the original scoresheet was 65.18 months. The properly calculated scoresheet reflects a lowest permissible prison sentence of 53.4 months.
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McCREA v. State, 980 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)…all not be considered successive by the trial court. An evidentiary hearing may be necessary to determine whether McCrea’s plea agreement was premised upon the lowest permissible prison sentence under the sentencing guidelines. See Johnson v. State, 976 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). We note that if McCrea is ultimately successful in setting aside his plea agreement, he will, in the absence of a new plea agreement, be exposed to any legal sentences that could be imposed upon conviction of the offenses charged…
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Mays v. State, 89 So. 3d 1009 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)…view of the record suggests that the calculations are significant because Mays pled to the lowest permissible prison sentence. See generally, Brooks v. State, 969 So. 2d 238 (Fla.2007); State v. Anderson, 905 So. 2d 111 (Fla.2005); Johnson v. State, 976 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). We therefore reverse and remand on this issue only. On remand, the court may attach portions of the record to conclusively refute this ground or it may conduct an evidentiary hearing. We affirm without discussion the trial court…
Authorities Cited
- Spera v. State, 971 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 2007)
- Dellofano v. State, 946 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007)
- Williams v. State, 825 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)