MARK STEWART, APPELLANT,
v.
LORI STEWART, APPELLEE
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The court held that automatic upward modification of alimony based solely on the paying party's income increase is generally improper without proof of changed circumstances.
The former husband appealed a final judgment of dissolution of marriage, challenging the reservation of jurisdiction for automatic upward modification…
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PER CURIAM.
The former husband appeals from a Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage and raises two issues for review. With respect to the issue raised on imputation of income to the former wife, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and affirm that finding.
The other issue raised is whether the trial court properly reserved jurisdiction for an automatic upward modification of alimony should the former husband’s income increase or should the former wife lose her job. “[Ajutomatic increases in alimony based solely on income increases of the paying party are generally improper.” Hamilton v. Hamilton, 552 So. 2d 929, 931 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (citing Featherngill v. Featherngill, 478 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)). There is an exception to this general rule. See, e.g., Llopis v. Llopis, 731 So. 2d 719, 720 n. 2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (where the court makes a finding that the party entitled to receive alimony has financial needs greater than the financial ability of the spouse to pay, it would be appropriate for the court to find what the actual alimony needs are and then reserve jurisdiction to increase payments if the spouse’s ability to pay increases).
The trial court found that the former husband had the ability to pay more than the amount of alimony actually awarded, therefore, it should not have reserved jurisdiction for any increases in alimony without the necessary proof of a substantial change in circumstances. See § 61.14, Fla. Stat. (2005); Woolf v. Woolf, 901 So. 2d 905, 912 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005). We reverse and remand for the deletion of these provisions from the Final Judgment of Dissolution.
Affirmed, in Part; Reversed in Part.
KLEIN, HAZOURI and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Woolf v. Woolf, 901 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)
- Hamilton v. Hamilton, 552 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- Featherngill v. Featherngill, 478 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Fed. Ins. Co. v. Fatolitis, 478 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Llopis v. Llopis, 731 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)