ROBERT MURPHY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Robert Murphy appealed his DUI and driving with suspended license convictions, challenging five sentencing claims. The court reversed the trial court's imposition of a no early termination of probation condition, holding that courts cannot divest the Department of Corrections of its authority to recommend early termination or prevent the circuit court from exercising its discharge discretion.
The trial court erred in imposing the no early termination condition. Murphy properly preserved the issue by filing a Rule 3.800(b)(2) motion because the condition was not orally pronounced at sentencing, making timely oral objection impossible. The court cannot impose conditions that divest the Department of Corrections of authority to recommend early termination or prevent the circuit court from exercising its discharge discretion.
[1] A defendant properly preserves for appeal a sentencing condition that was not orally pronounced by the trial court.
[2] A trial court may not impose a special condition of probation that divests the Department of Corrections of its authority to recommend early termination of probation.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The trial court may not impose a special condition of probation that purports to divest the Department of Corrections (DOC) of its authority to recommend early termination of Mr. Murphy's probation.”
Establishes the core holding that sentencing courts lack authority to restrict the DOC's statutory powers regarding probation recommendations.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMurphy was convicted of driving under the influence (third or subsequent offense) and driving with a suspended license (third or subsequent offense). …
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Early Termination Of Probation cases and more on FLexlaw
LaROSE, Judge.
Robert Murphy appeals his conviction and sentence for driving under the influence of alcoholic beverages, third or subsequent conviction, and driving while license suspended, third or subsequent conviction. See §§ 316.193(2)(b)(l), 322.34(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2005). Mr. Murphy raises five claims, only one of which has merit. The trial court erroneously imposed a no early termination of probation condition. We reverse on that point.
The trial court orally pronounced a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days in county jail followed by five years of probation. The written judgment and sentence included the additional condition of no early termination of probation. Mr. Murphy challenged this condition in a motion to correct sentencing error. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.800(b)(2). The trial judge denied relief, concluding that Mr. Murphy waived the issue by not objecting at the sentencing hearing. The sentencing transcript reflects, however, that Mr. Murphy could not object earlier because the trial court did not orally pronounce this condition. Therefore, he properly raised and preserved the issue for appeal. See Amendments to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.111(e) & 3.800 & Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.020(h), 9.UO, & 9.600, 761 So. 2d 1015, 1016, 1017 (Fla.2000) (stating rule 3.800(b) provides mechanism to correct sentencing error when written sentence deviates from oral pronouncement).
The trial court may not impose a special condition of probation that purports to divest the Department of Corrections (DOC) of its authority to recommend early termination of Mr. Murphy’s probation.1 See § 948.04(3), Fla. Stat. (2005); Swedish v. State, 724 So. 2d 640, 640 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Baker v. State, 619 So. 2d 411, 412 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). Additionally, the trial court may not prevent the circuit court from exercising its discretion to discharge Mr. Murphy in the future. See § 948.05, Fla. Stat. (1991); Baker, 619 So. 2d at 412.
The State concedes error. Therefore, we direct the trial court, on remand, to strike the special condition of probation and to correct the sentence and probation order so that the DOC is aware that the special condition no longer exists. We affirm on Mr. Murphy’s remaining claims without further discussion.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
WHATLEY and CASANUEVA, JJ., Concur. . This special condition is a substantive error that is correctable on appeal where preserved • with a rule 3.800(b)(2) motion. Cf. Ladson v. State, 955 So. 2d 612, 613 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (affirming unpronounced, but otherwise proper, special condition of probation raised in rule 3.800(b) motion); Grubb v. State, 922 So. 2d 1002, 1004 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (same).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
State v. LaFAVE, 113 So. 3d 31 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)…t of Corrections (DOC) of its authority to recommend early termination pursuant to section 948.04(3) and such provisions prevent future courts from exercising discretion to discharge defendants pursuant to section 948.05. See, e.g., Murphy v. State, 976 So. 2d 1242, 1243 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008); Swedish v. State, 724 So. 2d 640, 640 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Jones v. State, 666 So. 2d 191, 192 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); Baker v. State, 619 So. 2d 411, 412 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); see also Arriaga v. State, 666 So. 2d 949, 950 (Fla.…
-
Dominique Shantel Hopps v. State, 158 So. 3d 698 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)…the condition of no early termination of probation. The trial court erred by imposing “a special condition of probation that purports to divest the Department of Corrections (DOC) of its authority to recommend early termination.” Murphy v. State, 976 So. 2d 1242, 1243 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008); see also Baker v. State, 619 So. 2d 411, 412 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (“[A] trial judge is not authorized to divest the Department of Corrections of its authority to recommend early termination of probation.”). Ms. Hopps raised t…
-
O.P. v. State, 234 So. 3d 853 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018)…d from the-judgment and order of probation. Id. Both the Second and Fourth Districts have also concluded that a trial court is not authorized to impose a no early termination condition of probation on an adult defendant. See, e.g., Murphy v. State, 976 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008); Arriaga v. State, 666 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). In Arriaga, the court concluded, “If the probationer has fulfilled his obligations and has been a ‘model probationer,’ the interests of justice (not to mention the wise alloca…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Amendments TO Fla. Rules OF Crim. Procedure 3.111(e) & 3.800 & Fla. Rules OF App. Procedure 9.020(h), 791 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 2001)
- Grubb v. State, 922 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006)
- Henderson v. Henderson, 619 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)
- Ladson v. State, 955 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)
- Emmett William Baker v. State, 619 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
- Swedish v. State, 724 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)