SHAPIRO
v.
STATE
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Defendant Shapiro was convicted after a non-jury trial of improper lane change and rendering a false report of an accident. On appeal, Shapiro challenged the false report conviction arguing that Florida's statutory privilege protecting accident reports from use in evidence precluded prosecution for knowingly false reports, but the court rejected this argument and affirmed the conviction.
A person can be convicted for knowingly giving a false accident report despite the statutory privilege. The privilege protecting accident reports from evidentiary use applies only to cases arising out of the accident itself, not to prosecutions arising out of the giving of a false report. The statutory privilege does not shield a defendant from criminal liability for knowingly providing false information.
[1] A statutory privilege protecting accident reports from use as evidence in trials arising out of the accident does not shield a defendant from prosecution for knowingly pr…
[2] A prosecution for knowingly making a false report concerning a motor vehicle accident is not a case "arising out of the accident" to which the statutory privilege applies…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The very purpose of the statutory privilege cited by the defendant is to permit a person, such as Mr. Shapiro, to give correct, even if incriminating, information concerning án accident to the investigating officials — for the purpose of formulating accurate infor[mation] and statistics concerning motor vehicle accidents in our state — without fear that the report may later be used against him in any civil, ór criminál case arising out of the accident itself.”
Establishes the purpose of the statutory privilege and explains why false reports are not protected
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceShapiro was involved in a motor vehicle accident and filed a report concerning the accident. He was subsequently charged with improper lane change and…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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Final order of affirmance: The defendant appeals from a conviction after a non-jury trial, for improper lane change and for rendering a false report of an accident, in violation of F.S. 316.067.
The primary thrust of this appeal challenges the latter conviction on the ground in effect, that there can never be a conviction under the statute for giving such a false report because of the provisions of F.S. 316.066 which requires that such reports be made. Subsection (4), which is relied upon here, states that
“No such report sháll be used as evidence in any trial, civil or criminal, arising out of an accident,...”
(Emphasis supplied)
The court has concluded that there is no merit in the defendant’s contention.
The very purpose of the statutory privilege cited by the defendant is to permit a person, such as Mr. Shapiro, to give correct, even if incriminating, information concerning án accident to the investigating officials — for the purpose of formulating accurate infor*47mation and statistics concerning motor vehicle accidents in our state — without fear that the report may later be used against him in any civil, ór criminál case arising out of the accident itself. State v. Coffey, Fla. 1968, 212 So.2d 632. It seems cleár that since such a privilege has been granted, the defendant is surely not privileged knowingly to give, false information concerning the occurrence. Gordon v. State, Fla. 1958, 104 So.2d 524, so holds in a situation conceptually indistinguishable from this one. In essence, this case is not one “arising out of accident . . .” to which the privilege applies; rather, it is one “arising out of” the giving of a report, albeit a statutorily required one, concerning the accident. Since there is no question concerning the sufficiency of the evidence that the defendant’s report was in fact knowingly, falsely made, the defendant’s attack upon his conviction for the false report offense cannot be accepted.
The defendant also claims error in the trial court’s denial of his motion for continuance. This court concludes that no abuse of discretion has been demonstrated.
Accordingly, the judgment below is affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Salome v. State, 44 Fla. Supp. 166 (Dade Cty. Cir. Ct. 1976)
Authorities Cited
- Gordon v. State, 104 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 1958)
- State v. Coffey, 212 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1968)