MARISCOE DE BAHIA, S. A.
v.
STATE
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A defendant convicted of violating Florida's crawfish statute was acquitted on appeal because the statute prohibits only the act of stripping or molesting egg-bearing crawfish, not mere possession, and no evidence showed such stripping or molesting occurred in Florida.
A statute prohibiting the practice of stripping or molesting egg-bearing crawfish does not extend to mere possession of such crawfish absent explicit statutory language addressing possession.
[1] A criminal statute prohibiting the practice of stripping or molesting egg-bearing crawfish does not criminalize mere possession absent explicit statutory language extendi…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The practice of stripping or otherwise molesting egg-bearing crawfish in order to remove the eggs is prohibited.”
The statutory provision at issue, §370.14(2)(d), Florida Statutes.
Mariscoe de Bahia was convicted in Dade County Court of violating Florida Statutes §370.14(2)(d) based on possession of egg-bearing crawfish within Fl…
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The judgment on appeal in this case was entered on October 30, 1975 by the Dade County Court, Case No. 75-66131. The court found the defendant guilty of a violation of §370.14(2) (d), Florida Statutes, which provides —
*52“(d) The practice of stripping or otherwise molesting egg-bearing crawfish in order to remove the eggs is prohibited.”
It is apparent — and the trial judge acknowledged — that there is no evidence in the record to support a finding that egg-bearing crawfish were in fact stripped or otherwise molested within the state of Florida.
The trial judge concluded, however, that the statute forbade possession of such crawfish within the state, as was concededly amply demonstrated below.
The court cannot agree that this provision of the statute precludes mere possession of the crawfish in question. No such reference is contained in the sub-section involved in this case, in direct contrast to such other sections as §§370.14(2) (a) 1 and (2) (e), which make direct and specific references to “possession” and which preclude other types of crawfish from being “possessed.”
The strict construction required of criminal statutes such as this one precludes the determination made below concerning the scope of this provision.
It is accordingly ordered and adjudged that the judgment is reversed, with directions to discharge the defendant.