ERIC PRINCE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Eric Prince was convicted of grand theft auto after being found as a passenger in a stolen vehicle. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed his conviction, holding that mere presence as a passenger in a stolen vehicle, without more, is insufficient to establish the specific criminal intent required for grand theft auto.
The conviction for grand theft auto must be reversed because mere presence as a passenger in a stolen vehicle, with knowledge that it has been stolen, is insufficient to convict for grand theft. The State failed to prove Prince was anything other than an after-acquired passenger, and there was no evidence he exercised the possession, dominion, or control necessary to establish the specific criminal intent required by statute.
[1] A de novo standard of review applies when reviewing a motion for judgment of acquittal.
[2] A conviction supported by competent, substantial evidence will generally not be reversed on appeal.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Mere presence in a vehicle as an after acquired passenger, with knowledge that it has been stolen, is insufficient to convict for the charge of Grand Theft.”
Establishes the legal standard that mere presence as a passenger is insufficient for conviction of grand theft auto.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligencePrince was arrested as a passenger in a car stolen from Ariel Munoz. Munoz could not identify Prince as the person who stole the vehicle at the time o…
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POLEN, J.
Appellant Eric Prince appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of grand theft auto and the trial court’s ruling on a discovery violation. We are unpersuaded by Prince’s argument regarding the discovery violation but find merit in the judgment of acquittal claim.
In reviewing a motion for judgment of acquittal, a de novo standard of review applies. Generally, an appellate court will not reverse a conviction that is supported by competent, substantial evidence. If, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, a rational trier of fact could find the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, sufficient evidence exists to sustain a conviction.
Reynolds v. State, 934 So. 2d 1128, 1145 (Fla.2006) (internal citations omitted). “In moving for a judgment of acquittal, a defendant ‘admits not only the facts stated in the evidence adduced, but also admits every conclusion favorable to the adverse party that a jury might fairly and reasonably infer from the evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting Beasley v. State, 774 So. 2d 649, 657 (Fla.2000)).
Prince was accused of stealing a car from Ariel Munoz. Munoz was unable to identify Prince at the time the theft was committed or at trial. A few days after the car was stolen, Prince was arrested in connection with another crime. At the time of his arrest, Prince was a passenger in Munoz’s stolen car. The State charged Prince with grand theft auto under the theory that he knew or should have known the car was stolen. At trial, Prince denied stealing the vehicle or knowing it was stolen and the State did not introduce testimony identifying Prince as the person who stole the car. We find the trial court erred in denying Prince’s motion for judgment of acquittal as to the charge of grand theft auto as the State failed to prove Prince was anything other than a passenger in the car. “Mere presence in a vehicle as an after acquired passenger, with knowledge that it has been stolen, is insufficient to convict for the charge of Grand Theft.” See State v. G.C., 572 So. 2d 1380 (Fla.1991) (receded from on other grounds, I.T. v. State, 694 So. 2d 720 (Fla.1997)). “[A] mere passenger in a vehicle-who has not exercised such possession, dominion, or control over the vehicle as to indicate an intent to participate in the “taking” of that vehicle-cannot be convicted of theft because there is insufficient proof of the specific criminal intent required by statute.” G.C., 572 So. 2d at 1382.
We reverse Prince’s conviction as to the charge of grand theft auto and affirm on all other counts.
GROSS and MAY, JJ., concur.
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A.D.P. v. State, 223 So. 3d 428 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017)…idence that a person was a passenger in a previously stolen vehicle is insufficient to prove the theft of the vehicle. Canady v. State, 813 So. 2d 161, 161 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); A.J.R. v. State, 726 So. 2d 326, 327 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999); Prince v. State, 979 So. 2d 1212, 1213 (Fla. 4th [*431] DCA 2008). When the State fails to show that the accused exercised dominion and control over the vehicle, such as when a person is merely a passenger, a motor vehicle theft has not been established. See A.D. v. State, 106 So.…
Authorities Cited
- Beasley v. State, 774 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 2000)
- Reynolds v. State, 934 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. 2006)
- I.T. v. State, 694 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1997)
- State v. G.C., 572 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. 1991)