JOHN G. WILLIAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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John G. Williams appealed the denial of his motion for belated postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(b)(3), claiming he had retained counsel to file a timely postconviction motion but counsel failed to do so. The appellate court affirmed the denial, holding that Williams failed to establish that counsel was specifically retained for filing a postconviction motion or that counsel negligently failed to file one.
The court held that Williams failed to establish a claim for belated postconviction relief under Rule 3.850(b)(3) because he did not present evidence that counsel was specifically retained to file a postconviction motion or that counsel negligently failed to do so. Additionally, Florida courts do not recognize claims for ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel.
[1] A claim for belated postconviction relief under Rule 3.850(b)(3) requires proof that counsel was retained specifically to file a postconviction motion and subsequently fa…
[2] Retaining counsel generally to explore options to avoid a death penalty does not establish retention for the specific purpose of filing a postconviction motion.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Florida courts do not recognize claims for ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel.”
Establishes that even if postconviction counsel was ineffective, Florida law provides no remedy for such ineffectiveness.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWilliams was convicted in two separate cases of first-degree murder (sentenced to life imprisonment) and rape in 1969 (sentenced to death). Shortly af…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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ALTENBERND, Judge.
John G. Williams appeals an order denying his motion seeking belated postconviction relief based upon allegations that he retained counsel to file a timely motion but that counsel failed to do so. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850(b)(3). We affirm.
In two separate cases, Mr. Williams was convicted of first-degree murder and rape. Mr. Williams was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder. For the rape, however, which occurred in 1969, Mr. Williams was sentenced to death. Shortly after the judgments and sentences became final in this case, Mr. Williams, with the assistance of his parents, retained an attorney.
Mr. Williams’ belated motion for postconviction relief alleged that the attorney was retained to seek postconviction relief but never did so.1 At the evidentiary hearing on this claim, however, it was undisputed that the attorney was retained generally to do whatever he might deem appropriate to save Mr. Williams from the death penalty — -he was not expressly retained for the purposes of seeking general postconviction relief. Counsel testified at the hearing that based upon these instructions, he explored all available options and decided the best course of action was to pursue clemency, which he did. Although the clemency petition was unsuccessful, Williams was thereafter spared the death penalty pursuant to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). See In re Baker, 267 So. 2d 331, 333 n. 3 (Fla.1972). Based upon this evidence, the postconviction court correctly concluded that Mr. Williams had not established a claim for belated postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(b)(3) because he had not presented evidence that he or his parents retained counsel specifically for the purposes of filing a postconviction motion, nor that counsel thereafter, through neglect, failed to file such a motion.
On appeal, Mr. Williams complains generally that he now has information, unknown to him when he filed his motion, suggesting that counsel was ineffective in evaluating the options available and pursuing only a one-page petition for clemency. Even if that were the case, however, Mr. Williams would have no claim. Florida courts do not recognize claims for ineffec tive assistance of postconviction counsel. See Waterhouse v. State, 792 So. 2d 1176, 1193 (Fla.2001). The order denying belated postconviction relief is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.
STRINGER, J., and THREADGILL, EDWARD F., Senior Judge, Concur. . At the time, postconviction relief was available by way of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. See In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 196 So. 2d 124 (Fla.1967).
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Citator
Authorities Cited
- Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (U.S. 1972)
- Waterhouse v. State, 792 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 2001)
- In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 196 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 1967)
- Pellon v. State, 267 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972)