T.D.D., APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 2008-05-23
No. 2D06-5620
DAVIS, J., and THREADGILL, EDWARD F., Senior Judge, Concur.
981 So. 2d 674 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (2008)

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

T.D.D. appealed a disposition order in a juvenile delinquency case, arguing that the trial court violated double jeopardy principles by imposing a disposition order on December 4 that included a fifteen-day detention sentence that had already been imposed and partially served following an earlier November 16 hearing.


Holding

The court reversed the December 4 disposition order and remanded for imposition of a disposition order reflecting the trial court's November 16 oral pronouncements. The court found that once a sentence has been imposed and the person begins serving it, that sentence may not be increased without violating double jeopardy principles. The court also concluded that the record does not support imposition of anger management counseling as a probation condition.


Headnotes

[1] A disposition order entered after a defendant has begun serving a previously imposed sentence violates double jeopardy principles.

[2] A trial court may not increase a sentence once it has been imposed and the defendant has begun serving it.

Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“Once a sentence has been imposed and the person begins to serve the sentence, that sentence may not be increased without running afoul of double jeopardy principles.”

Establishes the foundational double jeopardy rule that the trial court violated by re-sentencing the appellant

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

T.D.D. was adjudicated delinquent for carrying a concealed firearm. On November 16, 2006, the trial court orally pronounced a disposition of fifteen d…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
SILBERMAN, Judge.

SILBERMAN, Judge.

T.D.D. appeals a disposition order rendered December 4, 2006, adjudicating him delinquent for carrying a concealed firearm, committing him to the Department of Juvenile Justice in a minimum risk placement, and ordering that he be detained at the Juvenile Detention Center for fifteen days followed by conditional release. The trial court entered the disposition order after a hearing held on November 30, 2006.

T.D.D. argues, among other things, that the December 4 disposition order violated the prohibition against double jeopardy because the court had previously announced its disposition at a hearing held on November 16, 2006, ordering T.D.D. into custody for fifteen days, followed by probation.

On November 17, 2006, the court rendered a judgment and a detention hold order placing T.D.D. in the custody of the Department of Juvenile Justice for fifteen days. T.D.D. immediately began serving the fifteen-day detention period following the November 16 hearing. He contends that the trial court erred by conducting a second disposition hearing on November 30 and then entering a disposition order placing him in secure detention for another fifteen days followed by conditional release. He asserts that the December 4 order must be reversed and that the case should be remanded for the trial court to enter a disposition order reflecting the oral pronouncements made by the court at the November 16 hearing.

The record reflects that T.D.D. filed a Motion to Correct a Sentencing Error, raising the same arguments that he raises in this appeal.

The trial court recognized that the December 4 order was problematic as it entered an order in August 2007 granting T.D.D.’s motion in part, finding that T.D.D. “should not have been sentenced to 15 days of Juvenile Detention on November 30, 2006 for the firearm offense as he was sentenced on November 16, 2006 for same.” However, the August 2007 order only directed that the December 4 disposition order be corrected to eliminate the fifteen-day detention requirement and did not vacate the disposition order. The State concedes that the December 4 disposition order must be reversed and that a new disposition order must be entered reflecting the court’s November 16 pronouncements.

We agree that the trial court erred by entering the December 4 disposition order. See Ashley v. State, 850 So. 2d 1265, 1267 (Fla.2003) (“Once a sentence has been imposed and the person begins to serve the sentence, that sentence may not be in creased without running afoul of double jeopardy principles.”); I.B. v. State, 771 So. 2d 1258, 1259 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (concluding that the trial court’s action in setting aside a disposition order and then “resentencing appellant after his sentence had already been served” violated double jeopardy). Thus we reverse the December 4 disposition order and remand for imposition of a disposition order reflecting the trial court’s oral pronouncements made at the November 16 hearing.

T.D.D. also argues that at the November 16 hearing the trial court erred by ordering that he attend anger management counseling as a condition of probation. See Brock v. State, 688 So. 2d 909, 911 (Fla.1997) (reiterating “the rule that special conditions of probation or community control must reasonably relate to the defendant’s present criminal conduct or future criminality, or pertain to conduct which is itself criminal” (construing Biller v. State, 618 So. 2d 734, 735 n. 1 (Fla.1993))). Although the transcript of the November 16 hearing is somewhat confusing, it does not appear that the trial court actually imposed this condition.

Moreover, none of the court’s written orders reflect the imposition of this condition.

We conclude that the record does not support the imposition of this condition and that the court may not include it in the disposition order to be entered on remand.

Accordingly, we reverse the December 4 disposition order and remand for the trial court to enter an order consistent with its oral pronouncement at the November 16 hearing and with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

DAVIS, J., and THREADGILL, EDWARD F., Senior Judge, Concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw