MYRA JAN STRASSNER, APPELLANT,
v.
DEAN EDWARD STRASSNER, APPELLEE
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The former wife appealed an order modifying child support and denying her contempt motion against her former husband. The trial court imputed income to the former wife to calculate retroactive child support arrearages that entirely offset the former husband's alimony obligation. The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by imputing income without sufficient findings and by failing to apply the proper child support guidelines.
The trial court abused its discretion because it either completely ignored the statutory child support guidelines requiring calculation based on the parent's percentage share of combined parental income, or it imputed income to the former wife equal to her former husband's income without evidentiary support. The finding that the former wife had the ability to earn at least minimum wage was insufficient to support income imputation under applicable case law.
[1] A trial court abuses its discretion when it imputes income to a parent for child support purposes without sufficient factual findings demonstrating the parent's ability t…
[2] A trial court's calculation of child support must comply with statutory guidelines, including those for determining the percentage share of support based on parental net…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court must find that "the parent owing a duty of support has the actual ability to earn more than he or she is currently earning, and that he or she is deliberately refusing to work at that higher capacity to avoid support obligations."”
Establishes the legal standard for imputing income in retroactive child support cases
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe former husband obtained exclusive residential custody and care of the children in August 2001. The trial court calculated that the former wife wou…
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WOLF, J.
The former wife challenges an order modifying child support and denying her motion for contempt against the former husband. We hold that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the former wife owed the former husband child support arrearages that entirely offset the former husband’s alimony to her. We, therefore, reverse and remand for further proceedings.
The trial court’s determination was primarily based on the following findings:
From the point in time the children’s residential care and custody was provided exclusively by the former husband (August 2001) until their respective emancipations, the former wife would have incurred a child support obligation of approximately $29,250.00, assuming her responsibility for one-half the support the parties contemplated would be necessary for the children’s maintenance (one-half of $1300.00 for 28 months and one-half of $850.00 for 26 months). Said amount is hereby established as the child support arrearage for the former wife. The former wife at all material times had the ability to at least earn minimum wage.
The trial court may impute income to the payor spouse for purposes of determining whether retroactive child support is appropriate. See § 61.30(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2003); see also Stebbins v. Stebbins, 754 So. 2d 903, 907 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). As with an award of retroactive child support, the trial court’s imputation of income is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Smith v. Smith, 872 So. 2d 397, 398 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). To impute income pursuant to section 61.30(2)(b), the trial court must find that “the parent owing a duty of support has the actual ability to earn more than he or she is currently earning, and that he or she is deliberately refusing to work at that higher capacity to avoid support obligations.” Stebbins, 754 So. 2d at 907; Smith, 872 So. 2d at 398.
In the instant case, the trial court imputed income to the former wife to find that she had the ability to pay retroactive child support and determined that she was responsible for half of the $1,300 monthly support that was originally awarded to her based on the former husband’s yearly income of $85,000. The court’s calculation of child support must fail because the court either 1) completely ignored the child support guideline of section 61.30(9), Florida Statutes, which requires the court to determine the percentage share of child support by dividing the parent’s net income by the combined income of both parents or 2) imputed to the former wife income equal to that of her former husband. The first assumption is legally unsound, and the second is completely unsupported by the record.
The only finding expressed in the order regarding the former wife’s earning capacity was that she “had the ability to earn at least minimum wage.” This is insufficient to support the court’s imputation under Smith and Stebbins.
We, therefore, reverse and remand for further proceedings.
KAHN and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Wood v. Wood, 162 So. 3d 133 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)…es, 134 So. 3d 1110, 1115 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (citations omitted). A trial court’s decision to impute income to a parent for purposes of calculating child support obligations is also “reviewed for abuse of discretion.” [*136] Strassner v. Strassner, 982 So. 2d 1224, 1225 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). The trial court abused its discretion by imputing income to the former wife solely because she voluntarily left her new employment after only one month. Section 61.30(2)(b), Florida Statutes, requires imputation of income…
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Dep't OF Revenue v. Llamas, 196 So. 3d 1267 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016)…e this result with precedent from this Court authorizing the imputation of income only when the parent owing a duty of support has the actual ability to work and is refusing to do so in order to avoid support obligations. See Strassner v. Strassner, 982 So. 2d 1224, 1225 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (citing Stebbins v. Stebbins, 754 So. 2d 903, 907 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)). Because the record in this case does not support such a finding and in the absence of a Florida Supreme Court decision directly on point, I agree that…1 / 2
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Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 220 So. 3d 480 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017)…y who has no income or is earning less than is available to him based upon a showing that the party has the capability to earn more by the use of his best efforts. 679 So. 2d at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Strassner v. Strassner, 982 So. 2d 1224, 1225 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); Koeppel v. Holyszko, 643 So. 2d 72, 75 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). I agree with the decision in Department of Revenue v. Llamas, 196 So. 3d 1267 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016), and with the decisions in [*485] other jurisdictions which have…
Authorities Cited
- Smith v. Smith, 872 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004)
- Stebbins v. Stebbins, 754 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)