DEMARCUS COLLIER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Demarcus Collier appealed his conviction, which relied primarily on a child victim's pretrial statements that were recanted at trial. The Florida appellate court reversed the conviction, holding that recanted child victim statements require corroborating evidence and that the state failed to provide sufficient corroboration under the standard established in Baugh v. State.
A prior inconsistent statement of a child victim, standing alone, is insufficient as a matter of law to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Such recanted statements may sustain a conviction only in the presence of other proper corroborating evidence. The trial court erred in failing to consider corroboration, and the scant evidence presented here was insufficient to corroborate the child's recanted statements.
[1] A prior inconsistent statement of a child victim, recanted at trial, may sustain a conviction only in the presence of other proper corroborating evidence.
[2] Corroborating evidence is defined as evidence that differs from but strengthens or confirms what other evidence shows, especially that which needs support.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“involves the admission of pretrial statements as substantive evidence under the child victim hearsay exception in section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes (2001), after the child recanted the pretrial statements during her in-trial testimony”
Describes the core issue in the case, establishing the factual scenario that triggers the legal rule about corroboration
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCollier was convicted based largely on pretrial statements made by a child victim. During trial, the child recanted those statements. The trial court …
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PER CURIAM.
We grant the State’s Motion for Clarification, withdraw our previous opinion in Collier v. State, 33 Fla. L. Weekly D1103 (Fla. 1st DCA Apr.23, 2008), and substitute the following modified opinion as the opinion of the court. As in Baugh v. State, the present case “involves the admission of pretrial statements as substantive evidence under the child victim hearsay exception in section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes (2001), after the child recanted the pretrial statements during her in-trial testimony.” 961 So. 2d 198, 202 (Fla.2007). Baugh, decided by our supreme court after the trial in the present case, controls the outcome here.
Before Baugh, the supreme court established that a prior inconsistent statement of a child victim, standing alone, would be insufficient as a matter of law to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Beber v. State, 887 So. 2d 1248 (Fla.2004); State v. Green, 667 So. 2d 756 (Fla.1995). Prior statements, subsequently recanted at trial, may, however, sustain a conviction in the presence of “other proper corroborating evidence.” Green, 667 So. 2d at 761. The Baugh court looked to Black’s Law Dictionary for a workable definition of “corroborating evidence”: “Corroborating evidence is defined as ‘[e]videnee that differs from but strengthens or confirms what other evidence shows,’ especially ‘that which needs support.’ ” Baugh, 961 So. 2d at 204 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 596 (8th ed. 2004)).
The trial court here never apparently considered corroborating evidence, believing that the prior inconsistent statement would be sufficient substantive evidence of guilt. In its brief, the State argues that the corroborating evidence here is nonetheless stronger than the evidence rejected in Baugh. We cannot agree with the State’s assertion. The scanty evidence in the present case is, if anything, less substantial than that rejected by the court in Baugh. Accordingly, the trial court should have granted appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal.
We REVERSE appellant’s conviction.
KAHN, and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur; WOLF, J., concurs with opinion.
WOLF, J.,
Concurring.
I concur only because I’m required to by Baugh v. State, 961 So. 2d 198 (Fla.2007).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- State v. Green, 667 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 1995)
- Baugh v. State, 961 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 2007)
- Beber v. State, 887 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 2004)