JERMAINE THOMAS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Jermaine Thomas was convicted of robbery by sudden snatching and fleeing and eluding, and sentenced as both a habitual felony offender and prison releasee reoffender. On remand following the Florida Supreme Court's decision in State v. Hearns, the court reversed Thomas's PRR sentences because neither crime statutorily involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual.
Both PRR sentences must be reversed. Neither robbery by sudden snatching nor fleeing and eluding is an enumerated felony, and the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual is not a statutory element of either crime, so PRR sentences cannot be imposed for either offense.
[1] A prison releasee reoffender sentence requires that the crime be an enumerated felony or a felony involving the use or threat of physical force or violence.
[2] When determining if a felony qualifies for a prison releasee reoffender sentence based on the use or threat of physical force or violence, courts must consider only the s…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“courts must consider only the statutory elements of the offense, regardless of the particular circumstances involved”
Establishes the Hearns standard requiring examination of statutory elements rather than facts when determining PRR eligibility
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThomas was convicted by jury of robbery by sudden snatching and fleeing and eluding. He was sentenced for both crimes as a habitual felony offender (H…
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On Remand from the Supreme Court of Florida
PER CURIAM.
Jermaine Thomas was tried by jury, convicted of robbery by sudden snatching and fleeing and eluding, and sentenced for both crimes as both a habitual felony offender (HFO) and a prison releasee reoffender (PRR). Thomas appealed, challenging his conviction for robbery by sudden snatching and the sentences imposed for both offenses. In our prior opinion, we affirmed in all respects, save the PRR sentence imposed for the fleeing and eluding conviction. See Thomas v. State, 933 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), quashed, 969 So. 2d 353 (Fla.2007).
A prison releasee reoffender sentence is appropriate only if the crime for which the defendant is being sentenced is one of the enumerated felonies or “[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual.” § 775.082(9)(a)l., Fla. Stat. (2002). We reversed the PRR sentence for the fleeing and eluding conviction as the offense was neither an enumerated felony nor one that “involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual.” We affirmed the PRR sentence imposed for the robbery by sudden snatching, focusing on the evidence in Thomas’s case, rather than the statutory elements of the offense.
Following our initial decision in this case, our supreme court decided State v. Hearns, 961 So. 2d 211 (Fla.2007). Hearns involved the imposition of a violent career criminal sentence (VCC). Under the relevant statutes, a VCC sentence is possible provided a defendant is thrice convicted of certain enumerated felonies or “ ‘[a]ny forcible felony, as described in s. 776.08.’ ” Id. at 214 (quoting section 775.084(l)(d)l., Fla. Stat.). Section 776.08 defines “forcible felony” to include certain enumerated offenses and “any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual.” The supreme court held that in determining whether Hearns’ conviction for battery on a law enforcement officer was “any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual,” “courts must consider only the statutory elements of the offense, regardless of the particular circumstances involved.” 961 So. 2d at 212.
Thomas sought review of our earlier decision and, given the subsequent decision in Hearns, the supreme court quashed our prior opinion and remanded the case for reconsideration. Our decision to affirm Thomas’s conviction and his HFO sentences remains unaffected by Hearns and thus, without further comment, we again affirm as to these issues. Thomas’s PRR sentences, though, must be reversed. Neither crime is an enumerated felony nor is the “use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual” an element of either crime. See §§ 316.1935(2), 812.131(1), Fla. Stat.; see also Yates v. State, 978 So. 2d 281, 282 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (recognizing Hearns requires court to look to statutory elements of crime in determining whether PRR sentence may be imposed and holding robbery by sudden snatching will not support PRR sentence). In supplemental briefing on remand, the State has correctly conceded error on this issue.
Reversed and Remanded.
STEVENSON, MAY and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., concur. DAMOORGIAN, J., was not on the original panel, but has reviewed the record on appeal.
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State v. Letiva Williams, 9 So. 3d 658 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)…meant to be a broad generalized statement that no felony battery can ever qualify for imposition of a PRR sentence. Certainly, that will depend on whether the statutory elements of section 784.01, Fla. Stat (2006) are satisfied. See Thomas v. State, 983 So. 2d 746, 747 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). Here, the defendant was adjudicated guilty of felony battery under section 784.041, Florida Statutes (2005), which requires great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement. Unlike the crime committed by…
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A.M. v. State, 147 So. 3d 98 (Fla. 3d DCA 2014)…we conclude that robbery by sudden snatching is not, by its statutory elements, a violent third-degree felony and should not have been designated as such in the instant case when scoring A.M.’s offense under the Risk Assessment. See Thomas v. State, 983 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (holding the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual is not a statutory element of the crime of robbery by sudden snatching). See also T.K. v. State, 125 So. 3d 970 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)(holding that, give…
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Dixon v. State, 41 So. 3d 990 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)…ular form of burglary.”). Fourth, we previously have found that “robbery by sudden snatching” does not qualify as a “felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual” under section 776.08. Thomas v. State, 983 So. 2d 746, 747 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (citing State v. Hearns, 961 So. 2d 211, 212 (Fla.2007)). During the sentencing hearing, the circuit court stated that, if the defendant did not qualify as a violent career criminal, then it would have sentenced the defenda…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Hearns, 961 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 2007)
- Thomas v. State, 933 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)
- Thomas v. State, 969 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 2007)
- Yates v. State, 978 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)