REGINALD BURKS, PETITIONER,
v.
WALTER A. MCNEIL, SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, RESPONDENT

Fla. 1st DCA | 2008-06-16
No. 1D07-5666
BROWNING, C.J., ALLEN and BENTON, JJ., concur.
984 So. 2d 619 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (2008) Caution
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

Reginald Burks challenged the Florida Department of Corrections' calculation of his sentence, arguing that applying the 1983 version of the gain-time statute to his 1981 offense violated the ex post facto clause. The court granted his petition, finding that the retroactive application of the more stringent statute disadvantaged him when his parole was revoked and gain-time was forfeited.


Holding

The court held that applying the 1983 version of section 944.275 to Burks' 1981 offense violated the ex post facto clause because the lump sum award under the revised statute was disadvantageous to him upon parole revocation and forfeiture of gain-time.


Headnotes

[1] Applying a revised statute to calculate forfeited gain-time for an offense committed before the revision violates the ex post facto clause when the revised statute is dis…

[2] The application of the 1983 version of section 944.275, Florida Statutes, to an offense committed in 1981, resulting in a greater penalty upon parole revocation due to a…

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Key Quotes

“the use of the revised 1983 version of section 944.275 to calculate gain-time forfeited for an earlier offense date is disadvantageous to the prisoner and, therefore, violates the ex post facto clause”

Establishes the core legal principle that retroactive application of more stringent gain-time statutes violates the ex post facto clause when disadvantageous to the prisoner.

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Facts & Procedural History

Petitioner Burks committed an offense in 1981 and was incarcerated. The Department of Corrections calculated his gain-time using the 1983 version of s…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner seeks review of an order denying a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner challenged the Department of Corrections’ calculation of his sentence. He contended that the Department violated the ex post facto clause when it applied the 1983 version of section 944.275, Florida Statutes, to his offense committed in 1981. The Department’s use of the more generous gain-time statute and award in a lump sum resulted in a greater penalty to petitioner upon revocation of his parole. This court’s decision in Avera v. Barton, 632 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) is directly on point. Therefore, we grant the petition.

This Court has previously held in Avera, that the use of the revised 1983 version of section 944.275 to calculate gain-time forfeited for an earlier offense date is disadvantageous to the prisoner and, therefore, violates the ex post facto clause. Here, the lump sum award of basic gain-time was disadvantageous to petitioner when he violated his parole and the Department forfeited the entire amount. The gain-time statute in effect at the time of petitioner’s offense provided for basic gain-time to be earned under the 3-6-9 formula on a monthly basis, rather than the 10 days a month under the 1983 version. A review of the rule in effect on the date of offense, Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-11.045, indicates that gain-time was to be awarded or withheld monthly, rather than the lump sum award under the current version of the rule.

Accordingly, we grant the petition and remand for a determination of basic gain-time forfeited by petitioner up to the point of his release to parole under the formula in effect in 1981.

PETITION GRANTED and REMANDED for further proceedings.

BROWNING, C.J., ALLEN and BENTON, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Sirron J. Johnson v. State, 18 So. 3d 623 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)
    …, this Court held that although Apprendi does not apply retroactively, Ap-prendi and Blakely apply to a defendant who is resentenced after Apprendi became final but before Blakely was decided. This holding was recently reaffirmed in Monnar v. State, 984 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). In that case, this Court noted that the supreme court held in Galindez v. State, 955 So. 2d 517 (Fla.2007), that a harmless error analysis applies to any Apprendi/Blakely error. This Court went on to hold: The supreme court’s d…
    1 / 2
  • McNEIL v. Stoker, 13 So. 3d 1086 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009)
    …PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. Burks v. McNeil, 984 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). WOLF, KAHN, and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur.…

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