DUPONT BUILDERS, INC., APPELLANT,
v.
SARAH ELIZABETH BAKER; SAMUEL M. ALLEN, D/B/A ISLAND WOODS; AND VICTOR DUPONT, APPELLEES
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DuPont Builders, Inc. appeals the trial court's denial of its motion for attorney's fees after prevailing in a construction contract dispute. The court reversed, holding that section 768.79, Florida Statutes, provides an independent statutory basis for attorney's fees when a defendant receives a rejected settlement offer and prevails at trial, regardless of whether the underlying contract contains an attorney's fees clause.
A defendant is entitled to attorney's fees under section 768.79 and rule 1.442 when all statutory requirements are met—a rejected offer of judgment and a judgment at least twenty-five percent less favorable than the offer—regardless of whether the underlying contract contains an attorney's fees provision. Section 768.79 creates an independent, substantive, and statutory basis for awarding attorney's fees that does not depend on contractual authorization.
[1] A statutory offer of settlement, when properly made and rejected, creates an independent basis for an award of attorney's fees, irrespective of whether the underlying con…
[2] A defendant is entitled to attorney's fees under section 768.79, Florida Statutes, and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 when a plaintiff rejects a valid offer of jud…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Section 768.79 and rule 1.442 mandate an award of attorney's fees to a defendant when there is a rejected offer of judgment and a finding of no liability.”
Establishes the mandatory nature of attorney's fees awards under the statute when statutory requirements are met.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSarah Baker filed a complaint against DuPont Builders, Inc., Victor DuPont, and Samuel M. Allen alleging multiple causes of action arising from a cons…
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Associate Senior Judge.
DuPont Builders, Inc., challenges the trial court’s denial of its motion for attorney’s fees. We reverse.
This case arose out of a dispute pertaining to a contract for construction. Sarah Baker filed a complaint alleging several causes of action against DuPont Builders, Inc., Victor DuPont, and Samuel M. Allen, d/b/a Island Woods. Victor DuPont and DuPont Builders served a combined proposal for settlement of all counts, offering one hundred dollars each. Ms. Baker rejected the offers. Following a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of the defendants. Victor DuPont and DuPont Builders then filed a joint motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2006), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442. The trial court granted the motion as to Victor DuPont, but denied the motion as to DuPont Builders. The basis for the trial court’s denial of DuPont Builders’ motion was that the underlying construction contract did not contain a provision for attorney’s fees.
Section 768.79 and rule 1.442 mandate an award of attorney’s fees to a defendant when there is a rejected offer of judgment and a finding of no liability. See MGR Equip. Corp. v. Wilson Ice Enter., Inc., 731 So. 2d 1262, 1263 (Fla.1999). We can find no authority supporting the trial court’s conclusion that an award of attorney’s fees pursuant to section 768.79 and rule 1.442 may not be had if the underlying contract fails to contain a provision for attorney’s fees. To the contrary, we conclude that section 768.79 creates an independent, substantive, and statutory basis for the award of attorney’s fees when the requirements of the statute have been met. DuPont Builders made an offer, the offer was refused by Ms. Baker, and the subsequent judgment was at least twenty-five percent less than the offer of judgment. All the requirements for seeking attorney’s fees under section 768.79(6)(a) and rule 1.442 were met by DuPont Builders. We therefore reverse and remand for an award of appropriate attorney’s fees to DuPont Builders.
Reversed.
WHATLEY and SILBERMAN, JJ., Concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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United Auto. Ins. Co. v. Comprehensive Health Ctr., 173 So. 3d 1061 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015)…independent, substantive, and statutory basis for the award of attorney’s fees when the requirements of the statute have been met.” United Auto. Ins. Co. v. Virgo, 116 So. 3d 1288, 1289-90 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (quoting DuPont Builders, Inc. v. Baker, 987 So. 2d 146, 147 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)). Moreover, it has been established that the failure of the circuit court to grant an award of appellate fees, conditioned upon meeting the terms of the offer of judgment statute, in a scenario similar to the instant one is a…
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United Auto. Ins. Co. v. John S. Virga, D.C., P.A., 116 So. 3d 1288 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013)…her or him ....”) (emphasis added). In such cases, “section 768.79 creates an independent, substantive, and statutory basis for the award of attorney’s fees when the requirements of the [*1290] statute have been met.” DuPont Builders, Inc. v. Baker, 987 So. 2d 146, 147 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). Therefore, the circuit court, acting in its appellate capacity, should have awarded United appellate attorney’s fees, pursuant to section 768.79. The failure to do so was a departure from the essential requirements of law.…
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John S. Virga, D.C., P.A. v. United Auto. Ins. Co. (11th Cir. Ct. App. Div. 2013)
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- MGR Equip. Corp., Inc. v. Wilson ICE Enters., Inc., 731 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1999)