RALEIGH M. BROADNAX, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Raleigh Broadnax was convicted of robbery and sentenced to life in prison. The appellate court affirmed the conviction and sentence but reversed in part to strike certain improperly imposed costs that lacked proper oral pronouncement or ability-to-pay determinations.
The $80 and $65 costs must be stricken because the trial court failed to make the requisite ability-to-pay determination for the $80 cost and failed to orally pronounce the $65 cost at sentencing. However, both costs may be reimposed on remand if the court finds Broadnax has the ability to pay. The $50 and $200 costs were properly imposed because retroactive application of section 939.185 does not violate ex post facto prohibitions, and section 938.05 was enacted before the offense.
[1] A prosecution/investigative cost imposed under section 938.27, Florida Statutes (2000), must be stricken if the trial court fails to consider the defendant's financial re…
[2] A discretionary cost imposed under section 775.083(2), Florida Statutes (2000), must be orally pronounced at sentencing.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court was required to consider "the financial resources ... [and] the financial needs and earning ability of the defendant" before imposing this prosecution/investigative cost”
Establishes the requirement for ability-to-pay determination under section 938.27(5)
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBroadnax was convicted of robbery occurring on March 22, 2001, and sentenced to life in prison. At sentencing, the trial court imposed various costs t…
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FULMER, Judge.
Raleigh M. Broadnax was convicted of robbery, occurring on March 22, 2001, and sentenced to life in prison. We affirm the judgment and the prison sentence. We reverse only to the extent that certain costs were improperly imposed. Broadnax first argues that the trial court erred in imposing an $80 cost pursuant to section 938.27, Florida Statutes (2000), because the trial court did not determine whether Broadnax was able to pay this cost. This cost was not orally imposed. We agree that the $80 cost must be stricken because under the 2000 version of section 938.27(5), the trial court was required to consider “the financial resources ... [and] the financial needs and earning ability of the defendant” before imposing this prosecution/investigative cost. See Clark v. State, 963 So. 2d 911, 912-13 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); Thibault v. State, 945 So. 2d 646, 647 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).
Next, Broadnax challenges the trial court’s imposition of $65 pursuant to section 775.083(2), Florida Statutes (2000). He argues that this cost should be stricken because it was discretionary on the date of the offense, it was not orally pronounced, and no determination was made as to Broadnax’s ability to pay, citing Stewart v. State, 916 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). We agree that, pursuant to Stewart, this $65 assessment for the Crime Prevention Court Cost must be stricken because it was not orally pronounced at sentencing. However, both challenged costs may be reimposed on remand if the court finds that Broadnax has the ability to pay. See Clark, 963 So. 2d at 913.
Broadnax also argues that a $50 cost and a $200 cost should be stricken because the offense occurred before the effective dates of the authorizing statutes, sections 939.185 and 938.05. We reject these claims. As to the $50 cost, the supreme court has held that retroactive application of section 939.185, Florida Statutes (2004), does not violate ex post facto prohibitions. Griffin v. State, 980 So. 2d 1035 (Fla.2008). As to the $200 cost, this cost is authorized under section 938.05, which was enacted under chapter 97-271, Laws of Florida, before Broadnax’s offense.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
STRINGER and VILLANTI, JJ., Concur.
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Citator
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Grady Clifford Love v. State, 992 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)…must be stricken. See 775.083(2)(b); Clark v. State, 963 So. 2d 911, 913 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). However, the trial court may reimpose this fine if it determines that Love has the ability to pay. See Clark, 963 So. 2d at 913; see also Broadnax v. State, 987 So. 2d 160, 161 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (citing Clark). The trial court imposed a $16.25 cost pursuant to section 938.10, Florida Statutes (2004). The trial court must strike this cost on remand because Love did not commit one of the offenses required for the stat…
Authorities Cited
- Griffin v. State, 980 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 2008)
- Stewart v. State, 916 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005)
- Clark v. State, 963 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)
- Robert v. Thibault, 945 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)