KEITH D. BELCOURT, APPELLANT,
v.
REBEKAH M. HARACZKA AND THE LOUNGE, INC., APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The court held that a defaulting party is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding unliquidated damages.
Appellant appealed the denial of his motion to vacate a default judgment, arguing he did not receive sufficient notice of the hearing to determine unl…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Motion To Vacate Default Judgment cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Appellant Keith Belcourt appeals the trial court’s order summarily denying his motion to vacate a default judgment. He presents several arguments for reversal of the order, however we find merit in only one.
Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in awarding appellee $60,221.70 in unliquidated damages without providing him sufficient notice or a full evidentiary hearing on the matter. We agree. “A defaulting party has a due process entitlement to notice and an opportunity to be heard as to the presentation and evaluation of evidence necessary to a judicial determination of the amount of unliq-uidated damages.” Security Bank, N.A. v. BellSouth Adver. & Publ’g Corp., 679 So. 2d 795, 800 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996) (citing Bowman v. Kingsland Dev., Inc., 432 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)); see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.440(c) (“If the court finds the action ready to be set for trial, it shall enter an order fixing a date for trial. Trial shall be set not less than 30 days from the service of the notice for trial.... In actions in which the damages are not liquidated, the order setting an action for trial shall be served on parties who are in default in accordance with rule 1.080(a).”).
In this case, appellant was not provided sufficient notice of the hearing to determine damages, as required by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.440(c). Therefore, we REVERSE the final judgment and REMAND this case to the circuit court for further proceedings on the relief requested by appellee Rebekah Haraczka in the complaint.
DAVIS, VAN NORTWICK, and POLSTON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Krueger v. Ponton, 6 So. 3d 1258 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009)…. A defaulting party has a due process entitlement to receive notice and an opportunity to be heard as to the presentation and evaluation of evidence necessary to a judicial determination of the amount of unliquidated damages. Belcourt v. Haraczka, 987 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). Damages are “liquidated damages” when the proper amount to be awarded can be determined with exactness from the cause of action as pleaded by an arithmetical calculation or by application of definite rules of law. Cellular Wareh…
-
Iman Emami v. Progressive Brands, Inc., 225 So. 3d 983 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017)…ordance with rule 1.080.”); Ciprian-Escapa v. City of Orlando, 172 So. 3d 485, 488 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (“[I]t is fundamental error to set unliquidated damages without the notice, proof, and hearing required by rule 1.440(c).”); Belcourt v. Haraczka, 987 So. 2d 175, 176 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (“A defaulting party has a due process entitlement to notice and an opportunity to be heard as to the presentation and evaluation of evidence necessary to a judicial determination of the amount of unliquidat-ed damages.” (qu…
Authorities Cited
- Flagship Nat'l Bank OF Miami v. Gray Distrib. Sys., Inc., 432 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983)
- Sec. Bank, N.A. v. Bellsouth Advertising & Publ'g Corp., 679 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)