FLORIDA PAROLE COMMISSION, PETITIONER,
v.
RANDOLPH BROWN, RESPONDENT
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The Florida District Court of Appeal reversed a circuit court order that had remanded a parole suspension decision back to the Florida Parole Commission for reconsideration. The court held that a parole suspension decision can only be set aside for demonstrated abuse of discretion, and the inmate failed to show such abuse.
The circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law by directing the Parole Commission to reconsider its decision. A parole suspension decision may only be set aside for demonstrated abuse of discretion, which the respondent failed to establish.
[1] A court may set aside a Parole Commission's decision to suspend an inmate's presumptive parole release date and defer setting an effective parole release date only upon a…
[2] An abuse of discretion by the Parole Commission may be established by demonstrating a deviation from legal requirements, such as the obligation to review the inmate's com…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A decision by the Parole Commission to suspend an inmate's presumptive parole release date and defer setting an effective parole release date can be set aside by a court only for demonstrated abuse in the exercise of the Commission's discretion.”
Establishes the legal standard for reviewing parole suspension decisions
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Florida Parole Commission suspended an inmate's presumptive parole release date and deferred setting an effective parole release date. The circuit…
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PER CURIAM.
We grant the Florida Parole Commission’s petition for writ of certiorari and quash the circuit court’s order remanding to the Commission to reconsider its parole decision.
A decision by the Parole Commission to suspend an inmate’s presumptive parole release date and defer setting an effective parole release date can be set aside by a court only for demonstrated abuse in the exercise of the Commission’s discretion. See Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm’n v. Paige, 462 So. 2d 817 (Fla.1985); see also Fla. Parole Comm’n v. Huckelbury, 903 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). An abuse of discretion may be established in various ways, including a showing that the Commission deviated from the legal requirements imposed upon it, such as the obligation to review the inmate’s complete record and to articulate the basis for its decision. Williams v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 625 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). An abuse of discretion also occurs if the denial of parole is based upon illegal grounds or improper considerations. Id. at 937; see also Moore v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm’n, 289 So. 2d 719 (Fla.1974). Hepe, respondent did not show that the Commission deviated from the legal requirements imposed upon it, and the record likewise fails to establish that the Commission based its decision upon illegal grounds or improper considerations. We therefore conclude that the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law when it directed the Parole Commission to reconsider its decision.
Accordingly, the circuit court’s order is QUASHED, and this matter is REMAND ED for further proceedings consistent herewith.
BARFIELD, VAN NORTWICK, and PADOVANO, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Alday v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 58 So. 3d 327 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011)…e release date can be set aside by a court only for a demonstrated abuse in the exercise of the Commission’s discretion. See Florida Parole & Probation Comm’n v. Paige, 462 So. 2d 817 (Fla.1985). As we observed in Florida Parole Commission v. Brown, 989 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), an abuse of discretion may be established in various ways, including a showing that the Commission deviated from the legal requirements imposed upon it, such as the obligation to review the inmate’s complete record and to articu…
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Dorrie Thomas v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 107 So. 3d 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013)…se date (EPRD) can be set aside by a court only for a demonstrated abuse in the exercise of the Commission’s discretion. See Florida Parole & Probation Comm’n v. Paige, 462 So. 2d 817 (Fla.1985). As we observed in Florida Parole Commission v. Brown, 989 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), an abuse of discretion may be established in various ways, including a showing that the Commission deviated from the legal requirements imposed upon it, such as the obligation to review the inmate’s complete record and to articu…
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Earley v. Fla. Comm'n ON Offender Review, 152 So. 3d 691 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014)…cretion.” Fla. Parole Comm’n v. Huckelbury, 903 So. 2d 977, 978 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). However, a deviation by the Commission from the legal requirements imposed upon it amounts to an abuse of its discretion. Id.; see also Fla. Parole Comm’n v. Brown, 989 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); Williams v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 625 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), receded from on other grounds, Sheley v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 703 So. 2d 1202 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). We conclude that such a deviation occurred here. Under the leg…
Authorities Cited
- Rayfield Moore v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 289 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1974)
- Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n v. Paige, 462 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1985)
- Williams v. Fla. Parole Comm'n, 625 So. 2d 926 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)
- Fla. Parole Comm'n v. Huckelbury, 903 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)