SHALLIST THOMAS HUDSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Shallist Thomas Hudson, a youthful offender, appealed the revocation of his probation and the seven-year sentence imposed. The court reversed because the seven-year sentence violated the six-year cap imposed by Florida Statutes § 958.14 for technical violations by youthful offenders.
A trial court may not impose a sentence exceeding six years for technical violations by a youthful offender, and may not revoke a youthful-offender designation upon probation revocation. Hudson's seven-year sentence violated the statutory cap and was therefore erroneous.
[1] A youthful offender's probation revocation sentence for a technical violation cannot exceed six years or the maximum sentence for the offense, whichever is less.
[2] A court may not change a defendant's youthful offender status upon revocation of probation or community control.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“no youthful offender shall be committed to the custody of the department for a substantive violation for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he or she was found guilty, with credit for time served while incarcerated, or for a technical or nonsubstantive violation for a period longer than 6 years or for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he or she was found guilty, whichever is less”
Statutory provision establishing the six-year cap for technical violations by youthful offenders
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceHudson was convicted of multiple felonies and sentenced as a youthful offender in 2004. In 2007, he violated probation by changing his residence witho…
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PER CURIAM.
Shallist Thomas Hudson appeals the trial court’s order revoking his probation. He contends that his seven-year sentence exceeds the six-year cap of section 958.14, Florida Statutes (2003), because he is a youthful offender and committed technical rather than substantive violations. The state concedes error. We reverse.
Hudson was convicted of multiple felonies and sentenced in 2004 as a youthful offender. He violated probation in 2007 by changing his residence without permission and by failing to remain at home for a scheduled visit from his probation officer. The court revoked Hudson’s probation and youthful-offender status and sentenced him as an adult to two years of community control followed by five years of probation, concluding that the second sentence of section 958.14, below, applies only when a court imposes a sentence of incarceration, because a combined sentence of community control and probation does not commit a defendant to “the custody of the department.” Because the trial court exceeded the sentence allowed by the first sentence of the provision, we need not address the second sentence.
Section 958.14 provides:
A violation or alleged violation of probation or the terms of a community control program shall subject the youthful offender to the provisions of s. 948.06. However, no youthful offender shall be committed to the custody of the department for a substantive violation for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he or she was found guilty, with credit for time served while incarcerated, or for a technical or nonsubstantive violation for a period longer than 6 years or for a period longer than the maximum sentence for the offense for which he or she was found guilty, whichever is less, with credit for time served while incarcerated.
When a defendant has been designated a youthful offender, the court may not change that status by way of revocation of probation or community control. See State v. Watts, 558 So. 2d 994 (Fla.1990); Watson v. State, 528 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Rogers v. State, 972 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). Under section 948.06(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2003), revocation of probation subjected Hudson to any sentence that might have originally been imposed, minus credit for time served. Because section 958.04(2)(a) limited a combined sentence of probation and community control to six years, the court erred by imposing a total of seven years. See Gardner v. State, 656 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.
KAHN, PADOVANO, and HAWKES, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Blacker v. State, 49 So. 3d 785 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)…f probation or community control. State v. Arnette, 604 So. 2d 482, 484 (Fla.1992); Johnson v. State, 41 So. 3d 1115 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010); Rogers v. State, 972 So. 2d 1017, 1019 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 988 So. 2d 622 (Fla.2008); Hudson v. State, 989 So. 2d 725, 726 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); Gardner v. State, 656 So. 2d 933, 937 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (“once a defendant is sentenced under the provisions of section 958.04, a court may not reclassify the defendant and sentence him or her in a manner inconsistent wit…
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Yegge v. State, 88 So. 3d 1058 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)…h a youthful offender may receive the maximum sentence that could have originally been imposed had he not been sentenced under the youthful offender act pursuant to section 958.14, he still maintains his “youthful offender status”); Hudson v. State, 989 So. 2d 725, 726 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (“When a defendant has been designated a youthful offender, the court may not change that status by way of revocation of probation or community control.”); Gardner v. State, 656 So. 2d 933, 937 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (holding t…
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Eustache v. State, 248 So. 3d 1097 (Fla. 2018)…efits of youthful offender sentencing. See, e.g. , Christian , 84 So. 3d at 442 ; Blacker , 49 So. 3d at 788 ; Gadson v. State , 160 So. 3d 496, 496 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) ; Jacques v. State , 95 So. 3d 419, 420-21 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) ; Hudson v. State , 989 So. 2d 725, 726 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). It was the Arnette majority's statement that a defendant always retains his or her "youthful offender status" after violating probation that led the panel in Christian to conclude that minimum mandatory terms did not apply…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- THE Florida BAR v. Hiram Lee Bauman, 558 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 1990)
- State v. Watts, 558 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 1990)
- Gardner v. State, 656 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)
- Watson v. State, 528 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
- MacIer v. In re Est. OF Bessie Giamportone, 972 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008)
- Rogers v. State, 972 So. 2d 1017 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008)